Candidate Qualifications and Out-Group Support: Evidence from Afghanistan

July 9, 2024

Abstract

Can qualifications help candidates from historically marginalized groups win over out-group voters? We help answer this question with an original conjoint experiment fielded on a face-to-face survey conducted in three Afghan provinces between 2016 and 2017. The conjoint asked over 2,400 Afghan respondents to rank and choose between profiles of hypothetical candidates with varying gender, ethnic and educational attributes. We explore whether candidate qualifications – as measured by educational attainment – can amplify respondents' support for hypothetical candidates from two social groups traditionally underrepresented in Afghan politics: women and Hazaras, a predominately Shi'a ethnic minority group. We find that higher qualifications consistently increase male (non-Hazara) respondents' ranking and likelihood of choosing profiles with female (Hazara) candidates. These gains, however, do not completely offset male (non-Hazara) respondents' in-group biases. Qualifications help but are not enough to dismantle voter preferences for in-group candidates.

Word Count: 10,196

1   Introduction

Voters generally prefer political representatives who look like them (Barnes and Burchard 2013; Carlson 2015; Chandra 2007; Dolan 2008; Hankla, Banerjee, Thomas, and Banerjee 2022; Kao and Benstead 2019; Schwarz and Coppock 2022). This bodes poorly for candidates from minority and historically under-represented groups who depend on out-group support to enter office. Can qualifications - be they professional experience, political accomplishments or educational attainment - help these candidates win over out-group voters?

Scholars disagree whether candidates' qualifications mitigate voters' in-group biases. Some argue that qualifications boost candidates' appeal to out-group constituents (Manzano and Sanchez 2010). Qualifications help dispel the assumptions and stereotypes that anchor biases against out-group candidates (Conroy-Krutz 2013). Others, however, warn that in-group biases diminish if not trivialise voters' assessments of out-group candidates' qualifications (Adida, Gottlieb, Kramon, and McClendon 2017; Carlson 2015).

We examine how candidate qualifications shape public attitudes towards female and Hazara candidates in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (IRoA) - which fell to the Taliban in 2021. Afghan women and Hazaras, a predominantly Shi'a ethnic minority group, have endured mass and state sponsored violence and discrimination over the past three decades (Mousavi 2018; Rashid 2002; UN Women 2021). If qualifications can amplify out-group support for female and Hazara candidates in Afghanistan, they are likely to aid minority and historically under-represented candidates anywhere. We assess whether candidate qualifications - as measured in terms of educational attainment - ameliorate female and Hazara candidates' appeal to male and non-Hazara Afghans.

Determining whether qualifications can broaden public support for historically under-represented candidates matters because candidates have much greater agency over their qualifications than other drivers of voter support. Ascriptive characteristics are largely fixed. Candidates' ability to tap into clientelistic networks to win votes may be bound by their ascriptive characteristics as well (Corstange 2016). Qualifications, in contrast, can be earned. If qualifications enhance out-group voters' support, then nominating highly qualified female and minority candidates can help diversify the political arena through the ballot box.

Measuring the impact of qualifications on public support for candidates from historically marginalized groups is challenging. Candidates from these groups are often *more* qualified than their competitors. This is due to a selection effect; Typically only highly qualified female and minority candidates are willing to run for office (Anzia and Berry 2011). When a highly qualified female or minority candidate loses an election, especially to a less qualified male or majority ethnic group candidate, one is tempted to conclude that candidate qualifications do not matter for historically under-represented candidates. The relevant benchmark to measure the importance of qualifications, however, is how the losing candidate would have fared if they were less qualified.

The paucity of less qualified female and minority candidates limits our ability to gauge the impact of qualifications on support for historically under-represented candidates. Quotas and institutionalized power-sharing arrangements obfuscate comparisons between female and male candidates or minority and majority candidates as well. More broadly, elections - especially in countries with a history of weak rule of law and rampant electoral fraud like Afghanistan (Callen and Long 2015) - are imprecise measures of public

opinion.

We circumvent these empirical challenges with an original conjoint survey experiment fielded on face-to-face surveys conducted in three Afghan provinces between 2016 and 2017. The conjoint experiment asked over 2,400 Afghan respondents to rank and choose hypothetical leadership profiles. These profiles randomly varied a hypothetical candidate's gender, ethnic group and educational attainment. We assess whether profiles with higher levels of educational attainment augment male and majority group respondents' ranking and likelihood of choosing candidate profiles with female, minority, and minority female attributes.

We find that qualifications generally increase men (non-Hazara) respondents' ranking and likelihood of choosing a female (Hazara) candidate. Qualifications also attenuate in-group biases. Male (non-Hazara) respondents are more likely to favor a profile with a higher educated female (Hazara) candidate than a profile with a less educated male (non-Hazara) candidate. Qualifications, however, do not erase in-group biases. When forced to choose between equally qualified candidates, respondents are more likely to pick an in-group candidate over an out-group one.

These findings advance our understanding of ethnic politics, gender politics and the power of candidate qualifications in shaping public opinion. We provide original evidence that qualifications can enhance historically under-represented candidates' favorability to out-group voters. But we also uncover that qualifications do not extinguish in-group biases completely. They help, but are not enough.

Our analysis helps nuance a divided literature over whether candidate qualifications curb in-group biases. It also enters an exciting stream of new research that examines the interaction of candidates' ascriptive and non-inherited identities - whether their policies (Bauer 2017; Blackman and Jackson 2021), piety (L. Benstead, Jamal, and Lust 2015; Kao and Benstead 2021) or party (Dolan 2014; Hayes and Lawless 2016; Holman, Merolla, and Zechmeister 2016; Ono and Burden 2019; Teele, Kalla, and Rosenbluth 2018) - in moulding public preferences.

Lastly, we present original public opinion data from Afghanistan. In the wake of the collapse of the IRoA, many wonder whether the Afghan public's indifference towards the Taliban's patriarchal policies abetted the Taliban's return to power. We provide strong evidence that the Afghan public was not uniformly hostile to women's political inclusion. That qualifications ameliorated male respondents' valuations of female candidates proposes that many Afghans were in fact open to female political leadership under certain circumstances.

The paper proceeds as follows. The next section surveys existing work on qualifications and public support for female and minority candidates. We then present our hypotheses. The third section provides background information on the Afghan case. We then describe our survey and empirical approach. The fifth section exhibits our results. We conclude by proposing future avenues of research and discussing the policy implications of our findings.

2 Candidate Qualifications and Out-Group Support

Existing work on qualifications and out-group support is divided. Optimists argue that qualifications can dismantle the informational heuristics that fuel in-group biases (Conroy-Krutz 2013). Absent of information about a candidate's qualifications, voters apply prevailing stereotypes about a candidate's capabilities and preferences. These stereotypes reinforce in-group preferences. For example, all else equal, voters will assume a coethnic candidate is more hardworking and more likely to favor coethnic constituents than a non-coethnic candidate. Likewise, unless informed otherwise, voters assume female candidates are less qualified and less interested in policy areas stereotypically associated with male expertise, like crime or national security. The historical absence of women and minorities in the formal political arena buttress voters' doubts about women and minority candidates' competencies (Mo 2015). Qualifications can correct these assumptions.

Voters may also value qualifications in and of themselves. Incumbency, one measure of qualifications, narrows the electoral gender gap in Chile (Piscopo, Hinojosa, Thomas, and Siavelis 2022; Shair-Rosenfield and Hinojosa 2014) and Indonesia (Toha and Hazra 2022). Manzano and Sanchez (2010) find that on average Latino voters are more likely to support a qualified non-Latino candidate over a less qualified Latino candidate, except among Latinos with strong ethnic attachments. Similarly, Collingwood (2020) argues that Anglo / White candidates in the United States can win over minority voters by developing group-specific policy expertise, minority-group cultural competence and fostering shared party identification.

Pessimists warn that in-group biases taint voters' evaluations of candidate qualifications. Some scholars of ethnic politics, for example, find little evidence of candidate qualifications augmenting non-coethnic support. This work measures candidate qualifications in terms of performance - how an incumbent fared in office. This is distinct from candidate quality - like educational attainment or expertise - which is a type of qualification that can be obtained outside of office. Using experimental and survey data from Benin, Adida et al. (2017) demonstrate that ethnicity shapes voters' evaluations of politicians' performance. Voters only reward good-performing incumbents if they are coethnic, and only punish bad performing non-coethnics. Carlson (2015) argues that ethnicity in Uganda is not a heuristic for candidate performance. Instead, ethnicity and performance interact in shaping Ugandans' candidate preferences. She finds that Ugandan voters value coethnic *and* high performing candidates in tandem. Low performing candidates do not benefit from coethnicity. Likewise, high performance does not endear non-coethnic candidates to voters because voters do not think they will benefit from a non-coethnic's high performance. In Kenya, however, Ferree, Gibson, and Long (2021) find that voters are more likely to use coethnicity as an evaluative shortcut when a candidate's performance is mixed.

Women's persistent under-representation despite female candidate generally having greater qualifications than men further questions whether qualifications can dismantle voters' in-groups biases. (Barnes and Holman 2019; O'Brien and Rickne 2016).[1] This disconnect suggests that voters may not view candidate's qualifications in a gender-neutral manner (Bauer 2020). For example, survey respondents in Vietnam were less supportive of female candidates when those candidates were associated with clean governance

---

1. See Profeta and Woodhouse (2022, p.1472) for an excellent overview of this literature.

(Schuler 2023). Moreover, unlike with male candidates, voters may be either indifferent or actually sanction female candidates with higher qualifications. Profeta and Woodhouse (2022) reveal that women with higher qualifications were not more likely to be elected in Italy.

Survey evidence, however, finds little difference in how respondents value political experience and educational qualifications across candidates' sex (Teele et al. 2018, p.534; Hankla et al. 2022, p.18; Hayes and Lawless 2016; A. Clayton, Robinson, Johnson, and Muriaas 2020; Shockley and Gengler 2020). Mo (2015) demonstrates that qualifications do not improve the likeability of female candidates among participants with male biases. Others warn that while respondents may value men and women's qualifications equally, they still expect women to uphold traditional gendered household expectations, imposing a "double-bind" on female politicians (A. Clayton et al. 2020; Teele et al. 2018).

Finally, a parallel strand of scholarship uncovers a backlash against women whose opportunities and qualifications defy prevailing stereotypes (Barnett, A. Jamal, and Monroe 2021; L. Benstead et al. 2015; Brulé 2020). This backlash occurs when members from a higher status group penalize members of a lower status group for making socio-economic gains. These penalties preserve the higher status group's superiority (L. J. Benstead, Muriaas, and Wang 2023, p.501). Pessimists worry that male (ethnic majority) voters may punish highly qualified female (ethnic minority) candidates for fear that historically under-represented candidates' empowerment would usurp existing hierarchies.

In summary, existing literature presents three contrasting expectations about the relationship between candidate qualifications and out-group support.

H0: Candidate qualifications have no effect on men (coethnic)'s support for female (non-coethnic) candidates.

H1: Higher candidate qualifications increase men (coethnic)'s support for female (non-coethnic) candidates.

H2: Higher candidate qualifications decrease men (coethnic)'s support for female (non-coethnic) candidates.

We advance this scholarship by examining how candidates' intersecting group identities influence the relationship between qualifications and candidate favorability. This intersectional approach, pioneered by Crenshaw (1991), proposes that the public does not view candidates' multiple identities in isolation. Instead, these identities interact in complex ways when shaping public attitudes towards political candidates (Mügge and Erzeel 2016). For example, coethnicity and religiosity augment public support for female candidates in Jordan (Kao and Benstead 2021) and Tunisia (L. Benstead et al. 2015).

In this study, we explore whether and how candidate identities and qualifications interact to shape out-group support. We assess whether qualifications improve out-group support for female candidates and ethnic minority candidates, and whether the effect of qualifications varies across types of social groups. Gender is more cross-cutting than ethnicity, which tends to coincide with other social groups like class or religion (Htun 2004). Perhaps men value highly qualified female candidates more than members of majority ethnic groups value highly qualified minority candidates because gender cuts across other politically salient social groups. This generates our third hypothesis:

H3: Candidate qualifications have a greater effect on improving out-group candidate support across genders than ethnic groups.

We then probe whether qualifications' ability to boost support for an out-group candidate is a gendered phenomenon. A highly qualified female candidate from an excluded ethnic group may signal very different leadership traits[2] and policies to male voters from historically included ethnic groups than a highly qualified male candidate from an excluded ethnic group. Being highly qualified *and* belonging to *two* historically marginalized groups (female; ethnic minority) could invoke a candidate's greater willingness to usurp existing power hierarchies to the detriment of voters from politically dominant social groups (male; ethnic majority) than a highly qualified candidate from one historically marginalized group (female *or* ethnic minority).

H4: Higher candidate qualifications only increase coethnic men's support for non-coethnic *male* candidates.

3   Background: Gender and Hazara Politics in Afghanistan

We center our analysis of qualifications and out-group support on two historically marginalized groups in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (IROA). The IRoA is an excellent site to study the effect of qualifications on out-group support. A low income, frequently violent and young democracy, the IRoA struggled to attract highly qualified candidates for national and especially local elections. As a result, and as we will demonstrate, Afghan voters strongly valued candidate qualifications. Thus we study the power of qualifications on public opinion in an electoral context where candidate qualifications are varied and wanted. Furthermore, two *types* of social groups have faced particularly significant political and social marginalization in Afghanistan: women and Hazaras. This helps us assess whether qualifications have the same impact on out-group support across different types of and interactions between social groups.

We examine whether candidate qualifications shape men's attitudes towards female candidates. Women and girls suffered under the Taliban rule in the decade before US-led forces brought the IRoA to power. The Taliban barred women almost entirely from the public sphere in the 1990s (Rashid 2002), including most work and educational opportunities (Zulfacar 2006). In 2001, the newly formed IRoA pledged to end women's political marginalization (Bush 2011). The 2004 Constitution recognized gender equality and mandated protections for women's rights (Shah 2005). It guaranteed at least 27 percent (68 seats) for women in the lower parliamentary house (the *Wolesi Jirja*), the country's main lawmaking body (Krook, O'Brien, and Swip 2010).[3] Seats were dis-

---

2. We define traits as a distinguishing characteristic of one's personal nature (Bauer 2020, p.5).

3. This quota is in line with other comparable low income countries, which averaged 23 percent for women's parliamentary representation in 2022 (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2023).

tributed proportionally across Afghanistan's 34 provinces, with a minimum of one seat reserved for women in each province. Although there were no formal quotas mandated for political parties, the parliamentary quota system incentivized political factions to put forth female candidates, though most ran as independents. Many prominent women took on leadership roles as ministers, parliamentarians and civil society leaders in the IRoA (Nijat and Murtazashvili 2015). Indeed, in 2019 there was a higher percentage of female representatives in Afghanistan's parliament that the US Congress (Barr 2020).

Women's political inclusion was bitterly contested during the Taliban's twenty year insurgency against the IRoA (Mosamim and Villeneuve 2023; Nijat and Murtazashvili 2015). Insurgents frequently targeted prominent female leaders, including activists, politicians, and judges (UN Women 2021). In spite of significant advancements, Afghanistan ranked 180th out of 191 countries on the Gender Development Index in the last year of IRoA rule (UNDP 2021).

It is unclear whether Afghan women's greater political representation in the IRoA relfected public support for female candidates and gender equality, nor is it clear the extent to which qualifications played a role in enhancing this support (Nijat and Murtazashvili 2015). Female leaders were generally well educated relative to the population, as were their male counterparts. Several prominent Afghan female politicians had medical degrees and PhDs.[4] Many received substantial educational and skills-based training from various international donors hoping to expand women's political representation (Nijat and Murtazashvili 2015). Not all female leaders, however, were highly educated. The pool of educated female candidates was much more constrained at local levels of government. Deteriorating security in the last years of the IROA winnowed elections to candidates who had access to or could afford private security. While those with access to financial resources were also more likely to be educated, quotas for women at village-level institutions such as Community Development Councils were often left unfilled or filled with women with low to no formal education (Bhatia, Jareer, and Mcintosh 2018).

We also assess whether qualifications can increase out-group support for Hazaras. The Hazaras are one of many ethnic groups residing in Afghanistan[5] and represent ten to twenty percent of the population.[6] They are concentrated in the country's central highland region. Hazaras predominately follow variants of Shi'a Islam, in contrast to the vast majority of Afghans whom identify as Sunni Muslim (Saikal 2012).

The Hazaras, like other ethnic minorities in Afghanistan, have endured a long history of persecution. While some ruled as feudal landlords and occasionally advanced to elite positions in government, many Hazaras lived as subsistence farmers, servants and slaves well into the 20th century (Mousavi 2018; Saikal 2012). Though slavery was outlawed in 1923 and conditions gradually improved throughout the 20th century, Hazaras still faced disproportionate obstacles in accessing education and political rights (Mousavi 2018). The Hazaras' marginalization intensified under the Taliban. The Taliban commit-

---

4. For security reasons we do not list individual examples; see Afghan Bios (2023) for more information on the profiles and qualifications of prominent Afghan leaders.

5. Afghanistan has an ethnic fractionalization rate of 0.766, a rate much higher than its neighbors (Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, and Wacziarg 2003).

6. As there has been no proper census of the Afghan population since the 1970s, the population share of Hazaras relative to the population is an estimate.

ted mass killings of Hazaras (Rashid 2002) and assassinated prominent Hazara leaders (Saikal 2012).[7]

As with women, the Hazaras' political and socio-economic conditions improved under the IRoA. The IRoA's constitution recognized Shi'a Islam. The new republic appointed Hazaras to key positions of power. Karim Khalili, for example, served as Vice President between 2004 and 2014. Mohammad Mohaqiq became an influential parliamentarian and leader of the *Hezb-e-Wahdat* party (Saikal 2012), a party associated with Hazaras. Several prominent Hazara women rose to important positions as well, such as provincial governor and mayor.

Though the Hazaras' ascension to leadership positions became more commonplace, many of these leaders were appointed by central government officials, making it difficult to assess the extent to which such leaders enjoyed popular support. While there were no formal ethnic quotas in parliament, Hazaras successfully increased their representation due to their geographic concentration and high levels of participation and ethnic solidarity (Semple 2011). Amidst their gains in political representation, Hazara communities confronted deepening sectarian violence - like the 2011 Ashura massacre and several attacks on Shi'a mosques - in the latter years of the IRoA (Adili 2022).

While many ethnic groups reside in Afghanistan, we focus on Hazaras for two reasons. First, public biases against Hazaras are stronger than any other ethnic group in our analysis (SI Figure 42). This presents a harder test for qualifications' ability to improve out-group support. Second, we suspect sectarianism underpins our respondents' anti-Hazara sentiments. Sectarian violence, and anti-Shia rhetoric by the Taliban, the Islamic State's (ISIS)'s Afghan affiliate the Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP), and other militant groups grew in the last years of the IRoA (*Afghanistan: ISIS Group Targets Religious Minorities* 2022; Sabir Ibrahimi 2020). Assessing whether qualifications can promote non-Hazaras' support for Hazara candidates can strengthen our understanding of how to diffuse voters' sectarianism, a challenge that extends beyond Afghanistan.

4   Data Collection and Survey Experiment

We test our hypotheses with an original in-person survey of over two thousand Afghan respondents. We conducted the survey in 2,485 households between 2016 and 2017 in three northern Afghan provinces: Balkh, Kunduz and Sar-e-Pul. The survey was a part of a broader project funded by the International Growth Centre which examined how perceptions of corruption, insecurity, and ethnic politics influenced Afghans' attitudes towards political leadership. This analysis is one facet of this research project.[8] Because we ran the survey in the "early days" of pre-registration (Ofosu and Posner 2021), we did not pre-register our hypotheses. We derived these hypotheses from our understanding of

---

7. It is important to note, however, that many Afghan ethnic groups suffered under the Taliban.

8. For example, we used this survey to investigate the impact of insecurity and support for female leadership (CITE XXXX).

Afghan society and existing work on intersectionality (Htun 2004), gender politics (A. Clayton et al. 2020; Hankla et al. 2022; Teele et al. 2018), and the qualifications and ethnic voting literature (Adida et al. 2017; Carlson 2015). See Supplementary Information (SI) Section 7.1 for more information on survey logistics and implementation.

We chose to conduct our survey in northern Afghanistan due to its relative ease of access in comparison with other parts of the country at the time. The three surveyed provinces are also ethnically diverse, allowing us to compare candidate preferences across ethnic groups. Public attitudes in the north are not representative of all of Afghanistan. Afghans in these provinces are generally believed to be more tolerant towards Hazaras and open to female leadership than other parts of the country. Respondents' biases against women and Hazaras are therefore likely to be less pronounced in these provinces than others.

The analysis' dependent variable is support for an out-group candidate. We measure respondents' candidate preferences with a conjoint experiment of hypothetical candidate profiles. Conjoint experiments require respondents to choose between profiles with numerous attributes, including non-sensitive ones, and never ask respondents for their preferences directly. This mitigates social desirability biases (Horiuchi, Markovich, and Yamamoto 2022), which may be especially pronounced towards out-group candidates.

Enumerators read respondents the following text off of their enumerator tablet:

Now I am going to show you a few pairs of profiles of potential leaders and ask you to choose, between the two, the one that you think would be the best advocate for you. Given a choice between these two profiles, which person would you prefer as a leader?

We categorize political leadership broadly in terms of a leader's ability to advocate for their constituents. We prefer this broader measure over specifying political leadership positions like president, parliamentarian or mayor to prevent respondents from thinking of actual candidates for these positions when choosing between leadership profiles in the conjoint experiment.

We use the term 'leader' rather than 'representative' because Afghanistan has multiple types of influential political authority figures beyond formal state representatives, including various types of community leaders, warlords, civil society activists, and insurgents (Weigand 2022). 'Leader' is also a broader term than 'representative' which could push respondents to think of only elected positions and the clientelist calculations underpinning electoral choices.

Enumerators then read leaders' profiles with the following attributes and values:

Table 1: Attributes of Leaders' Profiles

Attributes	Values
Gender	Male, Female
Age	28, 37, 49 57, 68
Education	Madrassa, High School, University Education in Afghanistan, University Education Abroad
Ethnicity	Pashtun, Tajik, Uzbek Hazara, Turkmen
Place of Birth	Balkh, Kabul, Kandahar Saripul, Kunduz
Professional Experience	Business Owner Donor Agency Employee Military Government Employee Private Sector Employee

The survey randomized candidates' attribute values and the order they were read. In addition to our main attributes of interest - gender, ethnicity and education, we included other attributes likely to be salient to respondents in assessing candidate suitability, such as age (an indication of length of prior experience and generational values), professional

experience, and place of birth.[9] There were three constraints in the randomization of candidate attribute values to ensure profile plausibility. Profiles with candidates younger than 30 did not have educational levels less than a High School.[10] Candidates born in Kandahar - a Pashtun-dominant province - were Pashtun. No hypothetical female leader had a military professional background. This is because there were so few women in the Afghan National Army (ANA) (Jones 2018). Finally, though party affiliation has an important effect on public perceptions of women's leadership abilities (Holman et al. 2016; Ono and Burden 2019), we did not include a political party attribute; the majority of Afghan leaders ran for positions independently, and most major parties were associated with particular individuals and/or ethnic factions.[11] Indeed, only eight percent of candidates were affiliated with a registered political party in the 2018 parliamentary elections, (Johnson and Barnhart 2020).

We measure candidates' qualifications through their education attainment. We code candidates with education attributes of *University Education*, whether in Afghanistan or abroad, as *Higher Educated*. Profiles with education attributes of High School or Maddrassa are codes as *Less Educated*.

Education captures candidate *quality*, a facet of qualifications that differs from candidate performance. Past performance is a undoubtedly valid measure of candidate qualifications. Performance, however, cannot tell us how voters would evaluate the qualifications of first-time candidates, who are often from historically under-represented groups.

We measure candidate qualifications in terms of quality for two reasons. First, at the time of data collection Afghanistan was still a newly established republic with a dearth of candidates with significant political experience — particularly female and Hazara minority candidates. Second, while post-2001 Afghanistan was internationally recognised as a sovereign state, in practice much of the day-to-day functioning of its institutions were heavily influenced by international donors and non-governmental organisations, which likely confounded how members of the public judged the performance of the political class, particularly at a technocratic level. We therefore focused on pre-electoral qualifications — in this case candidate education levels — as the most useful and realistic measure to explore these hypotheses in the Afghan context.

Granted, candidates' education signals more than their qualifications. Respondents may view a candidate's education level as signal of that candidate's values. They could infer that a highly educated female candidate would have more liberal policy preferences than a less educated female candidate. Education can also invoke a candidate's class (Desai and Frey 2021). Education is a bundled signal.

Nevertheless, though candidates' education can convey attributes outside of quali-

---

9. We added a place of birth attribute to evaluate respondents' preferences for local candidates, as some political representatives were installed by central government authorities and from elsewhere. Additionally, Kandahar was included as a place of birth an attribute value because it is a more conservative southern province and is considered the political centre for the Taliban. This attribute value was one way of measuring tacit support for the Taliban and Taliban-adjacent leaders.

10. This is because of the vast expansion of public school education in Afghanistan over the last twenty years.

11. The Hazara affiliated *Hezb-e-Wahdat*, for example, functioned more as a collection of competing interest groups from the Hazara community than a political party with a cohesive structure and program at the time of the survey.

fications - like class and ideology - it is still an acquired attribute. It can be obtained by any candidate regardless of their ascriptive or inherited characteristics. It is also a strongly desired candidate attribute in Afghanistan. When asked to rate the importance of a leader having a high level of education from one to six, with one being the least important and six being the most important, our survey respondents' mean response was 4.79. This is higher than their mean rating for a leader with government experience (2.88), strong religious values (3.87) or military experience (2.32) (SI Table 7.3). T-tests examining differences in respondents' mean support for highly educated leaders and leaders with military experience and public sector experience are statistically significant at the one percent level.

We examine the relationship between candidates' qualifications and respondents' support towards candidates from two types of ascriptive groups. The first is a candidate's *gender*, which in the Afghan context is widely perceived as a binary between Male and Female. The second ascriptive group is an ethnic one. We assess how candidate qualifications impact respondents' attitudes towards hypothetical candidates from the Hazara ethnic group. We also treat this variable as a binary, with hypothetical candidates being either Hazara or Non-Hazara. Lastly, we explore the impact of qualifications on support for candidates across both gender (male, female) and ethnic (Hazara, Non-Hazara) group categorizations.

Out-group support is the dependent variable. Male respondents are the out-group in assessing qualifications and support for female candidates. Non-Hazara respondents are the out-group in examining qualifications and support for Non-Hazara candidates. Non-Hazara respondents include Pashtuns (23 percent of all surveyed respondents), Tajiks (31 percent), Uzbeks (29 percent), Turkmen (4 percent) and other groups (5 percent). Hazaras, who are excluded from the population of Non-Hazara respondents, represented 8 percent of all surveyed respondents. Non-Haraza Male respondents are the out-group of interest when examining the impact qualifications on respondent support across candidates' gender and ethnic group. We subset each analysis to respondents from the relevant out-group.

We measure out-group respondents' candidate support through a forced choice conjoint experimental design (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014). Respondents had to choose between a pair of leadership profiles with randomized attributes three times. Respondents also had to rank each profile from 1 to 5.

Of the full dataset's 14,910 profiles, less than half have female candidates (*Female* = 1). Almost twenty percent of the hypothetical candidates are Hazara (*Hazara* = 1). Finally, over half of the profiles have hypothetical leaders with high levels of education (*Higher Educated* = 1).

We investigate whether out-group respondents' preferences for hypothetical leaders vary across candidates' qualifications and ascriptive identities. Most conjoint analysis examines attributes' Average Marginal Component Effect (AMCE). However, AMCEs estimated across subgroups are sensitive to reference or baseline category specification (Leeper, Hobolt, and Tilley 2020). Because who belongs to the out-group varies across hypotheses (males, non-hazaras, non-hazara males), and these out-groups' preferences for a leader likely varies across these subgroups as well, we follow Leeper et al. (2020) and use the *cregg* package to calculate and plot differences in marginal means (MM) estimates and conduct omnibus F tests to determine whether respondents' preferences for

out-group leaders differ across subgroups.[12] We cluster standard errors at the respondent level to account for the repeated number of observations per respondent. We use bias corrected standard error estimates in robustness checks as well (K. Clayton, Horiuchi, Kaufman, King, and Komisarchik 2024).

In a forced choice design, an attribute with an MM value of one indicates that respondents would choose a profile with that attribute with a probability of one. MMs in a forced choice design average 0.5 by definition, with values greater (lower) than 0.5 representing positive (negative) bias towards an attribute (Leeper et al. 2020, p.210). The following analyses first present plotted differences in MM estimates across profiles with varying qualifications and out-group attributes. It then presents MM estimates to convey candidate profiles over all favorability across qualification and out-group types. The SI includes AMCE estimates with highly qualified out-group candidate profile occupying the baseline category specification.

5 Results

5.1 Qualifications and Men's Support for Female Candidates

We begin by estimating male respondents' support for female candidates without taking qualifications into account. Figure 1 illustrates a gender gap in men's preferences for male over female candidates. It estimates that a male respondent will choose a profile with a male candidate roughly fifty-five percent of the time on average, and a profile with a female candidate forty-four percent of the time (SI Table 3).[13]

---

12. See 7.2 in the SI and Leeper et al. (2020) for a discussion on why MMs are a more appropriate measure for conjoint subgroup analysis.

13. Note that the MM estimates may not add up to one. This is because there a cases where respondents must choose between profiles with the same gender attribute.

Figure 1: Male Respondents' Preferences for Male and Female Candidates: Estimated Marginal Means (MM) and 95% Confidence Intervals

Note that the forty-four percent likelihood of choosing a female candidate is not an indicator of overall support for female leadership because all the other candidate attributes (ethnicity, age, place of birth and as we will see shortly, education) influence respondents' profile assessments as well (Horiuchi, Smith, and Yamamoto 2020). Conjoint experiments also do not disclose the intensity of respondents' preferences (Abramson, Koçak, and Magazinnik 2022). Figure 1 simply reveals that respondents are on average

more likely to pick a profile with a male leader over a female leader.

We then examine the effect of qualifications, as measured by educational attainment, on men's choice and ranking of hypothetical candidate profiles. Education has a substantial effect on respondents' choice of candidates. An F-test comparing a model of respondents' likelihood to choose a profile with the education attribute interacting with the gender attribute and a reduced model without the education attribute is statistically significant at the one percent level ($p < 0.01$).

Figure 2 measures the effect of candidate qualifications on male respondents' support for male and female candidates. It plots differences in MM between male candidates with high and low qualifications (top row), and between female candidates with high and low qualifications (bottom row). Male respondents have an almost fifteen percentage point higher mean probability of picking a profile with high qualified female candidate than a profile with a less qualified female candidate. This difference is comparable to male respondents' likelihood of picking a highly qualified male over less qualified male candidate profile. Qualifications increase men's support for female candidates. We find no evidence of male backlash against higher educated female candidates; male respondents are consistently more likely to pick a profile with a higher educated female candidate over a profile with a less educated female candidate.

Figure 2: Difference in Marginal Means (MM) estimates of Male Respondents' Choice of

High vs. Less Qualified Candidates Across Genders (95% Confidence Intervals)

Figure 3, however, shows that qualifications do not remove men's biases for male candidates. It captures differences in MM between highly qualified male versus female candidates, and less qualified male versus female candidates. Across both qualification levels, men are roughly ten percentage points more likely to select a male candidate profile over a female one.

Figure 3: Difference in Marginal Means (MM) estimates of Male Respondents' Choice of Male vs. Female Candidates Across Qualifications (95% Confidence Intervals)

Lastly, Figure 4 estimates MMs across the four candidate types. It shows that higher education reverses the gender gap in men's preferences when higher qualified female candidates compete against less qualified male candidates. Our models estimate that men would choose a candidate profile with a highly educated woman almost fifty two percent of the time. This is almost seven percentage points higher than their likelihood of choosing a profile with a less educated male candidate (SI Table 4).

Figure 4: Male Respondents' Preferences for Male and Female Candidates Across Qualifications: Estimated Marginal Means (MM) and 95% Confidence Intervals

Qualifications widen the gender gap in men's preferences when more educated male candidate profiles are paired with less educated female candidate profiles. Candidate profiles with highly educated men had the highest mean probability of being chosen (sixty-two percent, plus or minus two percentage points) across the four types of candidates. Profiles with less educated women had the lowest mean probability of being selected (thirty-seven percent, plus or minus two percentage points) (SI Table 4).

These patterns hold when examining male respondents' rankings of candidate profiles (SI Table 5), and when we disaggregate candidates who received their higher education abroad or in Afghanistan (SI Figure 13). Congruently, respondents' support (or lack thereof) of Madrassa educated candidates relative to Non-Madrassa educated candidates mirrors their education preferences (SI Figure 14). These findings are sufficiently powered (power: 0.99), and hold after correcting for measurement error biases in conjoint experiments (SI Figure 15) (K. Clayton et al. 2024). In support of H1, higher candidate qualifications augment men's preferences for female candidates.

5.2   Qualifications and Non-Hazaras' Support for Hazara Candidates

Next we examine whether higher candidate qualifications increase support for non-coethnic candidates. For this part of the analysis we exclude the roughly eight percent of respondents who self-identified as Hazara. When ignoring qualifications, a hypothetical candidate profile of a Hazara has a forty-two percent likelihood of being chosen by a non-Hazara respondent (SI Table 6). This is almost ten percentage points lower than a non-Hazara profile's likelihood of being chosen, and two percentage points less than a female candidate's average likelihood of being chosen.

Figure 5: Non-Hazaras' Preferences for Hazara and Non-Hazara Candidates: Estimated Marginal Means (MM) and 95% Confidence Intervals

Non-Hazara respondents' preferences towards Hazara candidates' qualifications closely mirror men's preferences towards female candidates' qualifications. An F-test comparing a model of respondents' likelihood to choose a profile with the education attribute interacting with the Hazara attribute and a reduced model without the education attribute is statistically significant at the one percent level (p < 0.01). As with female candidates, higher education increases non-Hazara respondents' support for Hazara can-

didates (Figure 6). A non-Hazara's MM of selecting a candidate profile with a highly educated Hazara candidate profile is fifteen percentage points higher than a less educated Hazara candidate profile. We do not find non-Hazara backlash against highly qualified Hazara candidates. Candidates' higher educational attainment augments a non-Hazara respondent's likelihood of selecting a profile with a Hazara candidate (H1).

Figure 6: Difference in Marginal Means (MM) estimates of Non-Hazara Respondents' Choice of High vs. Low Qualified Candidates Across Ethnic Groups (95% Confidence Intervals)

As with female candidates, qualifications do not erase non-Hazaras' biases against Hazaras. Among highly qualified candidates, non-Hazaras are still ten percentage points more likely to pick a non-Hazara profile than a Hazara one (Figure 7). This bias persists among less educated candidates as well.

Figure 7: Difference in Marginal Means (MM) estimates of Non-Hazara Respondents' Choice of Non-Hazara vs. Hazara Candidates Across Qualifications (95% Confidence Intervals)

Figure 8 presents each candidate type's MM of selection. Profiles with highly educated Hazara candidates have a MM rate of selection of almost fifty percent, plus or minus two percentage points (SI Table 7). This is roughly seven percentage points higher than a profile with a less educated non-Hazara candidate's likelihood of selection. These patterns remain when examining non-Hazara respondents' rankings of the different candidate types (SI Table 8). They endure regardless of whether a candidate's higher education was acquired in Afghanistan or abroad (SI Figure 21). Respondents consistently prefer higher educated over less educated candidates. They also favor non-madrassa educated candidates over madrassa educated ones (SI Figure 22). Correcting for measurement error biases do not substantively alter these patterns (SI Figure 23) (K. Clayton et al. 2024)

Figure 8: Non-Hazaras' Preferences for Hazara and Non-Hazara Candidates Across Qualifications: Estimated Marginal Means (MM) and 95% Confidence Intervals


These patterns are not an exclusively Hazara phenomenon either. Non-Pashtun respondents' preferences for qualifications among Pashtun - the second least favored ethnic group after Hazaras among our respondents (SI Figure 42)[14] - and non-Pashtun candi-

---

14. This may reflect anti-Pashtun sentiment in the north, where many non-Pashtuns blamed and sometimes attacked local Pashtuns in retaliation against the Pashtun-dominant Taliban (*Paying for the Tal-*

dates follow this pattern (SI Figure 44). Qualifications mitigate but do not erase in-group preferences. Meanwhile, qualifications have no effect on out-group support for candidates from more favored ethnic groups (SI Section 7.8).[15] Qualifications are best suited to improve out-group support for candidates from less popular ethnic groups.

Candidate qualifications improve out-group (Non-Hazara; Male) support for Hazara candidates and Female Candidates (H2). The magnitude of this effect is substantively similar across the two types of social groups. Contrary to H3, there is little evidence of qualifications being more beneficial for female candidates than Hazara candidates in winning over out-group support.

5.3   Qualifications and Non-Hazara Men's Support for Hazara Female Candidates

Lastly, we investigate the impact of qualifications on out-group support when taking into account candidates' gender *and* ethnicity. Figure 9 plots differences in MM estimates between high and less qualified candidates across the four gender and ethnic candidate combinations of interest (Female Hazara, Male Hazara, Female Non-Hazara, Male Non-Hazara). The in-group respondents in this analysis are Non-Hazara men. In line with the preceding findings, higher levels of candidate education ameliorates respondent support across all gender and ethnicity candidate combinations.

---

iban's Crimes: Abuses Against Ethnic Pashtuns in Northern Afghanistan 2002)

15. In our analysis these are Tajik, Turkmen and Uzbek (SI Figure 42).

Figure 9: Difference in Marginal Means (MM) estimates of Non-Hazara Male Respondents' Choice of High vs. Low Qualified Candidates Across Gender and Ethnic Groups (95% Confidence Intervals)

Qualifications, however, do not dislodge in-group biases. Figure 10 plots differences in MM estimates between in-group versus out-group candidates when holding candidate education levels constant. The in-group in this analysis is Non-Hazara male candidates, while the out-group represents the three other gender and ethnicity candidate combina-

tions. Non-Hazara male respondents are roughly ten percentage points more likely to pick a profile with a non-Hazara male candidate over other gender and ethnic types of candidates among both High and Low Qualified candidates.

Figure 10: Difference in Marginal Means (MM) estimates of Non-Hazara Male Respondents' Choice of In-Group vs Out-Group Candidates Across High and Low Qualified Candidates (95% Confidence Intervals)

Finally, Figure 11 presents MM estimates of a profile's likelihood of selection across profiles that vary the qualifications, gender and ethnicity of a hypothetical candidate.

Figure 11: Non-Hazara Men's Preferences for Hazara and Female Candidates Across Qualifications: Estimated Marginal Means (MM) and 95% Confidence Intervals

Figure 11 parallels the previous findings.[16] High qualifications amplify support for

16. Note that an F-test comparing a model of respondents' likelihood to choose a profile with the

in-group candidates. Profiles with highly qualified non-Hazara males have the highest MM estimate of selection (sixty-five percent, plus or minus two percentage points). Profiles with lesser educated Hazara female candidates have the lowest MM estimate (roughly thirty-nine percent, plus or minus two percentage points). However, less qualified in-group candidates were still less likely to be picked in the conjoint's forced choice design on average (forty-eight percent, plus or minus two percentage points). In-group membership is a necessary but insufficient condition for robust support. Figure 11 also demonstrates that qualifications and belonging to a majority ethnic group can reverse the gender gap in out-group support. A profile with a highly qualified non-Hazara female candidate has a higher mean probability of selection than a profile with a less qualified Hazara male candidate (0.53 versus 0.48) (SI Table 9).

The most striking feature of Figure 11, however, is that non-Hazara men remain biased against highly qualified Hazara female candidates. We estimate that non-Hazara men chose a profile with a highly educated Hazara female candidate roughly forty-two percent of the time, plus or minus six percentage points. This rate of selection was six percentage points lower than profiles with less educated, male non-Hazara candidates. Indeed, we find no statistically significant differences in a non-Hazara male's likelihood of choosing a highly educated female Hazara candidate and all the other types of less educated candidate profiles except for less educated female Hazara candidates. (SI Table 28).

These results do not imply that qualifications hurt Hazara women in the court of public opinion; qualifications increase female Hazara profiles' favorability to non-Hazara men (Figure 9). However, belonging to two out-groups (Female; Hazara) dampens these profiles' appeal relative to other candidate social group combinations. Though qualifications diminish out-group biases, these biases persist because female Hazara candidates have a lower baseline of support from non-Hazara men than their male and non-Hazara peers. In rejection of H4, qualifications can increase out-group support for non-coethnic female candidates. They are just not enough to negate out-group bias against female candidates and Hazara candidates.

---

education attribute interacting with the gender and Hazara attributes and a reduced model without the education attribute is statistically significant at the one percent level ($p < 0.01$).

6 Discussion and Conclusion

Some may worry that our findings are more indicative of respondents' class-based preferences for candidates, not their attitudes towards candidates' qualifications. Education and class are highly correlated (Krueger and Lindahl 2001). If class anchored these patterns, however, we would expect diverging candidate preferences between low and higher income respondents. Yet our findings persist when we subset our analysis across respondents' income groups. Both low and higher income respondents prefer higher educated over less educated out-group candidates and in-group candidates (SI Figures 18, 19, 26, 27).

Unlike with class, however, higher educated respondents display stronger preferences for higher educated out-group candidates (SI Figures 16, 24). Less educated respondents - defined as respondents who have not experienced tertiary education - are less likely to demonstrate a positive preference for university educated out-group candidates (SI Figures 17, 25). Perhaps respondents with higher levels of education are more likely to view candidates' education level as a signal on both competence and a type of governance that transcends in-group vs. out-group cleavages. Higher educated respondents may have had greater opportunities to come in contact with highly educated out-group members at university, bolstering their out-group support for highly educated out-group candidates. At the same time, Afghans with more inclusive preferences towards out-group candidates might also be more likely to pursue higher education. We cannot disentangle whether voters' education expands their support for out-group candidates or vice versa.

There are also important differences in how female respondents and Hazara respondents value in-group and out-group candidates' qualifications. Female respondents favor higher educated candidates. Like men, they also prefer higher educated male candidates over higher educated female candidates, but the magnitude of their male bias is smaller (SI Figures 31 and 33). Women display no gender when asked to choose between less qualified candidates.

In contrast, qualifications have less of a bearing on Hazara respondents' candidate support. They are as likely to pick a less educated Hazara candidate as a more educated non-Hazara candidate (SI Figure 35). Hazara respondents are also consistently biased against non-Hazara candidates across all levels of qualifications (SI Figure 37 and 38). Hazaras are not unique. Pashtun, Turkmen and Uzbek respondents are also as likely to pick a profile with less qualified coethnic as a more qualified non-coethnic (See SI Section 7.8).

These diverging responses may reflect Htun (2004)'s insight that gender cuts across more societal cleavages than ethnicity. Perhaps female respondents are more likely to believe that they can benefit from a highly educated male candidate, who could cater to the respondent's ethnic group, class or territory, then a Hazara respondent vis-a-vis a highly educated non-Hazara candidate. Qualifications may matter less to respondents when clientelistic benefits are channeled *within* ethnic groups (Carlson 2015).

These findings also reflect Afghanistan's rich ethnic diversity. No ethnic group among our respondents commanded a majority. Most of our respondents' choices among candidate profiles involved choose between two non-coethnic candidates. Nevertheless, our respondents viewed some some ethnic groups (Hazaras, Pashtuns) much less favorably than others (Uzbeks, Tajiks) (SI Figure 42). Though qualifications do not offset coethnic biases, they make candidates from less popular ethnic groups more favorable to non-

coethnics.

Stepping back, we find strong evidence that qualifications improve candidates' appeal to out-group voters. Across gender and ethnic groups, higher candidate qualifications correlate with greater out-group support. We find no evidence of qualifications penalizing out-group candidates. Nevertheless, while qualifications erode in-group biases, they do not displace them. When asked to choose between profiles of equal qualifications, our respondents were consistently more likely to pick hypothetical candidates from their in-group.

Our findings contribute to a rich scholarship on gender, ethnicity and qualifications. Though our results align with scholarship that views qualifications as a lever for out-group support (Collingwood 2020; Conroy-Krutz 2013; Manzano and Sanchez 2010), they also warn that qualifications may not be enough to erode in-group biases against some types of candidates (Adida et al. 2017; Carlson 2015; Profeta and Woodhouse 2022). We trail new ground by highlighting that candidates' intersecting identities may limit the benefits of qualifications to out-group supporters. The more out-groups a candidate belongs to, the less likely higher qualifications will weaken in-group biases.

These insights point to many exciting paths for future research. One next step is to unpack candidate qualifications in terms of performance and quality. This analysis finds that candidate quality improves out-group support. Existing work, however, uncovers little (Adida et al. 2017; Carlson 2015) and mixed (Ferree et al. 2021) evidence of candidate performance ameliorating out-group support. Future scholarship can assess whether voters value candidate quality and performance differently, and whether these differences can influence out-group support.

Our findings also do not disclose the mechanisms underpinning why respondents value out-group candidates' qualifications. Do they interpret higher qualifications to signal greater competence? Or that an out-group candidate will be more likely to attend to their group's interests? Future scholarship can investigate whether candidates with higher qualifications are less prone to favoring in-group constituents.

In terms of generalizability, we cannot tell whether these findings are a developing world phenomenon. A dearth of highly educated candidates may have pushed Afghan respondents to strongly value candidates' educational attainment. Recent work from the United States, however, suggests that the patterns uncovered in this analysis may travel to wealthier democracies. Using observational and survey data, Fulton and Dhima (2021) find that female Democratic candidates can attract support from male independent and Republican voters when they are more qualified than their competitor. They are penalized, however, when they are equally qualified. Future work can replicate our experimental research design in higher income contexts.

The Afghan conflict undoubtedly influenced respondents' valuations of candidate qualifications. Respondents may have inferred that profiles with less educated attributes represented hypothetical candidates who rose to prominence through conflict. Respondents in more peaceful settings are less likely to have made this inference. We encourage scholars to study the relationship between candidate qualifications and out-group support in more peaceful political arenas.

Our analysis carries important policy implications. Supporting highly qualified under-represented candidates is most likely to win out-group support. This strategy, however, risks sidelining "doubly-disadvantaged" (less-educated) out-group candidates. Nominating the already qualified could buttress existing socio-economic hierarchies. Investing in *all* candidates' qualifications will flatten them. While these investments can

be costly, they improve public acceptance of out-group political leaders. However, our research also demonstrates that qualifications may not be enough for out-group candidates to overcome in-group biases, and must be accompanied by changes in broader societal norms. Interventions, such as quotas and other power-sharing mandates, may also be needed.

Finally, our findings challenge the Taliban government's depiction of the Afghan public as uniformly opposed or indifferent to women's political inclusion. On the contrary, our research suggests that Afghans may actually prefer female candidates when they are more qualified than their male peers. Indeed, our findings emphasize that Afghans care about candidate qualifications. Many probably oppose the Taliban's Pashtun-centric approach to staffing senior government positions. Unfortunately, given that many highly qualified individuals have fled the country, along with recent Taliban edicts barring women and girls' access to education, much of the progress made towards political inclusion of women and marginalised ethnic groups is under threat for the foreseeable future.

References

Abramson, Scott F, Korhan Koçak, and Asya Magazinnik. 2022. "What do we learn about voter preferences from conjoint experiments?" *American Journal of Political Science* 66 (4): 1008–1020.

Adida, Claire, Jessica Gottlieb, Eric Kramon, and Gwyneth McClendon. 2017. "Overcoming or reinforcing coethnic preferences? an experiment on information and ethnic voting." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 12 (4): 437–477.

Adili, Ali Yawar. 2022. "A Community Under Attack: How successive governments failed west Kabul and the Hazaras who live there." *Afghan Analysts Network,* accessed January 17, 2022. https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports/war-and-peace/a-community-under-attack-how-successive-governments-failed-west-kabul-and-the-hazaras-who-live-there/.

Afghan Bios. 2023. *Afghan Biographies.* Accessed: 9 October 2023. https://www.afghan-bios.info.

Afghanistan: ISIS Group Targets Religious Minorities. 2022. Technical report. Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/09/06/afghanistan-isis-group-targets-religious-minorities.

Alesina, Alberto, Arnaud Devleeschauwer, William Easterly, Sergio Kurlat, and Romain Wacziarg. 2003. "Fractionalization." *Journal of Economic growth* 8:155–194.

Anzia, Sarah F, and Christopher R Berry. 2011. "The Jackie (and Jill) Robinson effect: why do congresswomen outperform congressmen?" *American Journal of Political Science* 55 (3): 478–493.

Barnes, Tiffany D, and Stephanie M Burchard. 2013. ""Engendering" politics: The impact of descriptive representation on women's political engagement in sub-Saharan Africa." *Comparative Political Studies* 46 (7): 767–790.

Barnes, Tiffany D, and Mirya R Holman. 2019. "Taking diverse backgrounds into account in studies of political ambition and representation." *Politics, Groups, and Identities* 7 (4): 829–841.

Barnett, Carolyn, Amaney A. Jamal, and Steve L Monroe. 2021. "Earned income and women's segmented empowerment: experimental evidence from Jordan." *American Journal of Political Science* 65 (4): 954–970.

Barr, Heather. 2020. *A Crucial Moment for Women's Rights in Afghanistan.* Technical report. Human Rights Watch. Accessed October 12, 2022. https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/03/05/crucial-moment-womens-rights-afghanistan.

Bauer, Nichole M. 2017. "The effects of counterstereotypic gender strategies on candidate evaluations." *Political Psychology* 38 (2): 279–295.

Bauer, Nichole M. 2020. "Shifting standards: How voters evaluate the qualifications of female and male candidates." *The Journal of Politics* 82 (1): 1–12.

Benstead, Lindsay, Amaney Jamal, and Ellen Lust. 2015. "Is it gender, religiosity or both? A role congruity theory of candidate electability in transitional Tunisia." *Perspectives on Politics* 13 (1): 74–94.

Benstead, Lindsay J, Ragnhild Muriaas, and Vibeke Wang. 2023. "Explaining Backlash: social hierarchy and men's rejection of women's rights reforms." *Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State & Society* 30 (2): 496–524.

Bhatia, Jasmine, Naseem Jareer, and Ross Mcintosh. 2018. "Community-driven development in Afghanistan." *Asian Survey* 58 (6): 1042–1065.

Blackman, Alexandra Domike, and Marlette Jackson. 2021. "Gender stereotypes, political leadership, and voting behavior in Tunisia." *Political Behavior* 43 (3): 1037–1066.

Brulé, Rachel E. 2020. "Reform, representation, and resistance: The politics of property rights' enforcement." *The Journal of Politics* 82 (4): 1390–1405.

Bush, Sarah Sunn. 2011. "International politics and the spread of quotas for women in legislatures." *International Organization* 65 (1): 103–137.

Callen, Michael, and James D Long. 2015. "Institutional corruption and election fraud: Evidence from a field experiment in Afghanistan." *American Economic Review* 105 (1): 354–381.

Carlson, Elizabeth. 2015. "Ethnic voting and accountability in Africa: A choice experiment in Uganda." *World Politics* 67 (2): 353–385.

Chandra, Kanchan. 2007. *Why ethnic parties succeed: Patronage and ethnic head counts in India.* Cambridge University Press.

Clayton, Amanda, Amanda Lea Robinson, Martha C Johnson, and Ragnhild Muriaas. 2020. "(How) do voters discriminate against women candidates? Experimental and qualitative evidence from Malawi." *Comparative Political Studies* 53 (3-4): 601–630.

Clayton, Katherine, Yusaku Horiuchi, Aaron R Kaufman, Gary King, and Mayya Komisarchik. 2024. "Correcting measurement error bias in conjoint survey experiments." *Working Paper.*

Collingwood, Loren. 2020. *Campaigning in a racially diversifying America: When and how cross-racial electoral mobilization works.* Oxford University Press, USA.

Conroy-Krutz, Jeffrey. 2013. "Information and ethnic politics in Africa." *British Journal of Political Science* 43 (2): 345–373.

Corstange, Daniel. 2016. *The price of a vote in the Middle East: Clientelism and communal politics in Lebanon and Yemen.* Cambridge University Press.

Crenshaw, Kimberlé. 1991. "Mapping the margins: Identity politics, intersectionality, and violence against women." *Stanford Law Review* 43 (6): 1241–1299.

Desai, Zuheir, and Anderson Frey. 2021. "Can Descriptive Representation Help the Right Win Votes from the Poor? Evidence from Brazil." *American Journal of Political Science.*

Dolan, Kathleen. 2008. "Is there a "gender affinity effect" in American politics? Information, affect, and candidate sex in US House elections." *Political Research Quarterly* 61 (1): 79–89.

Dolan, Kathleen. 2014. *When does gender matter?: Women candidates and gender stereotypes in American elections.* Oxford University Press, USA.

Ferree, Karen E, Clark C Gibson, and James D Long. 2021. "Mixed records, complexity, and ethnic voting in African elections." *World Development* 141:105418.

Fulton, Sarah A, and Kostanca Dhima. 2021. "The gendered politics of congressional elections." *Political Behavior* 43:1611–1637.

Hainmueller, Jens, Daniel J Hopkins, and Teppei Yamamoto. 2014. "Causal inference in conjoint analysis: Understanding multidimensional choices via stated preference experiments." *Political analysis* 22 (1): 1–30.

Hankla, Charles, Sayan Banerjee, Anjali Thomas, and Arindam Banerjee. 2022. "Electing Women in Ethnically Divided Societies: Candidates, Campaigns, and Intersectionality in Bihar, India." *Comparative Political Studies.*

Hayes, Danny, and Jennifer L Lawless. 2016. *Women on the run: Gender, media, and political campaigns in a polarized era.* Cambridge University Press.

Holman, Mirya R, Jennifer L Merolla, and Elizabeth J Zechmeister. 2016. "Terrorist threat, male stereotypes, and candidate evaluations." *Political Research Quarterly* 69 (1): 134–147.

Horiuchi, Yusaku, Zachary Markovich, and Teppei Yamamoto. 2022. "Does conjoint analysis mitigate social desirability bias?" *Political Analysis* 30 (4): 535–549.

Horiuchi, Yusaku, Daniel M Smith, and Teppei Yamamoto. 2020. "Identifying voter preferences for politicians' personal attributes: A conjoint experiment in Japan." *Political Science Research and Methods* 8 (1): 75–91.

Htun, Mala. 2004. "Is gender like ethnicity? The political representation of identity groups." *Perspectives on Politics* 2 (3): 439–458.

Inter-Parliamentary Union. 2023. *Women's representation in the parliaments of Least Developed Countries: From Istanbul (2011) to Doha (2022).* Technical report. United Nations. https://www.un.org/ldc5/sites/www.un.org.ldc5/files/women_in_ldc_parliaments_e.pdf.

Johnson, Thomas H, and Ronald J Barnhart. 2020. "An Examination of Afghanistan's 2018 Wolesi Jirga Elections: Chaos, Confusion and Fraud." *Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs* 7 (1): 57–100.

Jones, Sophia. 2018. "The Many Dangers of Being an Afghan Woman in Uniform." *New York Times Magazine* (October 5, 2018). Accessed October 12, 2022. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/05/magazine/afghanistan-women-security-forces.html.

Kao, Kristen, and Lindsay Benstead. 2019. "The importance of intersectionality: Gender, islamism, and tribalism in elections." *Program on Governance and Local Development Working Paper,* no. 23.

Kao, Kristen, and Lindsay Benstead. 2021. "Female electability in the Arab World: The advantages of intersectionality." *Comparative Politics* 53 (3): 427–464.

Krook, Mona Lena, Diana O'Brien, and Krista Swip. 2010. "Military Invasion and Women's Political Representation." *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 12 (1): 66–79.

Krueger, Alan B, and Mikael Lindahl. 2001. "Education for growth: Why and for whom?" *Journal of Economic Literature* 39 (4): 1101–1136.

Leeper, Thomas, Sara Hobolt, and James Tilley. 2020. "Measuring subgroup preferences in conjoint experiments." *Political Analysis* 28 (2): 207–221.

Manzano, Sylvia, and Gabriel R Sanchez. 2010. "Take one for the team? Limits of shared ethnicity and candidate preferences." *Political Research Quarterly* 63 (3): 568–580.

Mo, Cecilia Hyunjung. 2015. "The consequences of explicit and implicit gender attitudes and candidate quality in the calculations of voters." *Political behavior* 37:357–395.

Mosamim, Parwiz, and Jean-Patrick Villeneuve. 2023. "Women in government: the limits and challenges of a representative bureaucracy for Afghanistan (2001–2021)." *Policy Studies,* 1–25.

Mousavi, Sayed Askar. 2018. *The Hazaras of Afghanistan.* Routledge.

Mügge, Liza M, and Silvia Erzeel. 2016. "Double jeopardy or multiple advantage? Intersectionality and political representation." *Parliamentary Affairs* 69 (3): 499–511.

Nijat, Aarya, and Jennifer Murtazashvili. 2015. *Women's Leadership Roles in Afghanistan.* Technical report 350. US Institute of Peace.

O'Brien, Diana, and Johanna Rickne. 2016. "Gender quotas and women's political leadership." *American Political Science Review* 110 (1): 112–126.

Ofosu, George K, and Daniel N Posner. 2021. "Pre-analysis plans: An early stocktaking." *Perspectives on Politics,* 1–17.

Ono, Yoshikuni, and Barry C Burden. 2019. "The contingent effects of candidate sex on voter choice." *Political Behavior* 41 (3): 583–607.

Paying for the Taliban's Crimes: Abuses Against Ethnic Pashtuns in Northern Afghanistan. 2002. Technical report. Human Rights Watch. https://www.refworld.org/reference/countryrep/hrw/2002/en/33710.

Piscopo, Jennifer M, Magda Hinojosa, Gwynn Thomas, and Peter M Siavelis. 2022. "Follow the Money: Gender, incumbency, and campaign funding in Chile." *Comparative Political Studies* 55 (2): 222–253.

Profeta, Paola, and Eleanor F Woodhouse. 2022. "Electoral Rules, Women's Representation and the Qualification of Politicians." *Comparative Political Studies,* 00104140211047414.

Rashid, Ahmed. 2002. *Taliban: Islam, oil and the new great game in Central Asia.* IB Tauris London.

Sabir Ibrahimi, Said. 2020. "Growing Sectarianism Can Challenge Lasting Peace in Afghanistan." *The Diplomat* (October 15, 2020). Accessed October 15, 2020. https://thediplomat. com/2020/10/growing-sectarianism-can-challenge-lasting-peace-in-afghanistan/.

Saikal, Amin. 2012. "Afghanistan: The status of the Shi'ite Hazara minority." *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 32 (1): 80–87.

Schuler, Paul. 2023. "Gender and Clientelism: Do Expectations of Patronage Penalize Women Candidates in Legislative Elections?" *Comparative Political Studies,* 00104140231204248.

Schwarz, Susanne, and Alexander Coppock. 2022. "What Have We Learned about Gender from Candidate Choice Experiments? A Meta-Analysis of Sixty-Seven Factorial Survey Experiments." *The Journal of Politics* 84 (2): 655–668.

Semple, Michael. 2011. *The Rise of the Hazaras and the Challenge of Pluralism in Afghanistan 1978–2011.*

Shah, Niaz A. 2005. "The constitution of Afghanistan and women's rights." *Feminist Legal Studies* 13:239–258.

Shair-Rosenfield, Sarah, and Magda Hinojosa. 2014. "Does female incumbency reduce gender bias in elections? Evidence from Chile." *Political Research Quarterly* 67 (4): 837–850.

Shockley, Bethany, and Justin J Gengler. 2020. "Social identity and coethnic voting in the Middle East: Experimental evidence from Qatar." *Electoral Studies* 67:102213.

Teele, Dawn Langan, Joshua Kalla, and Frances Rosenbluth. 2018. "The ties that double bind: social roles and women's underrepresentation in politics." *American Political Science Review* 112 (3): 525–541.

Toha, Risa, and Anjali Hazra. 2022. "Winning Elections and Changing the Game? Challenges to Broadening Female Political Representation in New Democracies." *Unpublised Manuscript.*

UN Women. 2021. *Women's Rights in Afghanistan: Where Are We Now?* https://www.unwomen.org/sites/default/files/2021-12/Gender-alert-Womens-rights-in-Afghanistan-en.pdf. Accessed: 04-03-2023.

UNDP. 2021. *Gender Development Index 2021.* Accessed: 04-03-2023.

Weigand, Florian. 2022. *Waiting for dignity: legitimacy and authority in Afghanistan.* Columbia University Press.

Zulfacar, Maliha. 2006. "The pendulum of gender politics in Afghanistan." *Central Asian Survey* 25 (1-2): 27–59.

7 Supplementary Information

7.1 Background on Survey Implementation

We worked with an Afghan survey company to survey over 2,485 household surveys between August 2016 and January 2017 in three northern provinces: Balkh, Kunduz and Sar-e-Pul. The Taliban briefly occupied Kunduz during our survey collection. They had also occupied Kunduz briefly in September 2015, before IRoA forces retook control. Prior to data collection, we carried out 50 pre-test surveys in Afghanistan in May 2016. The 50 pre-test surveys are not included in the final sample.

The survey's sampling design relies on 80 sampling points selected by random draw per province, with a quota of 10 surveys per sampling point (half male, half female respondents). Enumerators began at a central landmark in the village and sampled every third house using a random walk method. Enumerators selected adult household members using the Kish Grid method. Male enumerators surveyed male respondents and female enumerators surveyed female respondents. Accordingly, enumerators worked in mixed-gendered pairs, often consisting of husband and wife or brother and sister.

Prior to data collection, we carried out 50 pre-test surveys in Afghanistan in May 2016. Enumerators also ran focus groups and piloted the questions among native speakers of both Dari and Pashto to ensure that the treatment and control primes were clear and that the control prime did not induce any emotions about insecurity. Adjustments were made to the questionnaire following the pre-test. The 50 pre-test surveys are not included in the final sample.

7.2 Theory: Marginal Means and Subgroup Analysis in Conjoint Experiments

Most conjoint analysis examines attributes' Average Marginal Component Effect (AMCE). However, AMCEs estimated across subgroups are sensitive to reference or baseline category specification (Leeper et al. 2020).

We follow Leeper et al. (2020) and use the *cregg* package to calculate and plot conditional marginal means (MM) and conduct omnibus F tests to determine whether respondents' preferences for leaders differ across subgroups. MMs capture average levels of favorability for a profile with an attribute—like a female candidate—ignoring all other attributes. AMCEs, by contrast, demonstrate how much an attribute changes an outcome's favorability relative to a baseline attribute level, conditional on averaging across all other attributes. AMCEs and MMs are similar across an entire sample. But the AMCEs for the reference categories of attributes are zero by design (p.210). Because absolute levels of favorability for a leader may vary across subgroups, a baseline attribute's favorability may also vary across subgroups. MMs incorporate these baseline differences in subgroups' preferences. MMs are therefore a more appropriate measure for conjoint subgroup analysis (Leeper et al. 2020).

7.3 Respondent Leadership Preferences

Table 2: Desired Attributes in a Leader (1 to 6)

Variable	Obs	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Well Educated	2485	4.79	1.36	1.00	6.00
Military Experience	2485	2.32	0.77	1.50	5.50
Government Experience	2485	2.88	1.31	1.00	6.00
Religious	2485	3.87	1.55	1.00	6.00
Provides Peace	2485	5.74	0.74	1.00	6.00
Punishes Criminals	2485	3.41	1.23	1.00	6.00

Note that higher scores indicate more desirable. Military experience score was calculated by averaging respondents' desire for leader with experience as a Mujahadeen fighter (1 to 6) and experience in the Afghan military (1 to 6).

7.4 Qualifications and Support for Female Candidates Among Male Respondents

Table 3: Marginal Means (MM): Preferences for Female and Male Candidates

Candidate's Gender	MM (SD)
Female	0.445
	(0.007)
Male	0.546
	(0.006)
Observations	6792

Table 4: Marginal Means (MM): Preferences for Female and Male Candidates Across
Education Levels (Choice)

Candidate's Gender	Less Educated	Higher Educated
Female	0.371	0.516
	(0.011)	(0.011)
Male	0.454	0.627
	(0.010)	(0.010)
Observations	3258	3534

Table 5: Marginal Means (MM): Preferences for Female and Male Candidates Across
Education Levels (Rating; 1-5)

Candidate's Gender	Less Educated	Higher Educated
Female	3.085	3.307
	(0.037)	(0.039)
Male	3.166	3.417
	(0.037)	(0.036)
Observations	3258	3534

7.4.1 Robustness Checks

Figure 12: Male Respondents' Preferences for Male and Female Candidates Across Qualifications: Average Marginal Component Estimates (AMCE) and 95% Confidence Intervals

Figure 13: Support for Male and Female Candidates Across Qualifications and Location of Education (Abroad vs. Domestic): Marginal Means (MM) Estimates and 95% Confidence Intervals (Choice)

Figure 14: Support for Male and Female Candidates Across Qualifications (Madrassa Education): Marginal Means (MM) Estimates and 95% Confidence Intervals (Choice)

Figure 15: Corrected Standard Error Estimates of MM Across Qualifications and Gender

Note that the conjoint experiment did not have a repeated task. As a result, we set the Intra-Respondent Reliability (IRR) rate to the most common estimate of 0.75.

7.4.2 Among Male Respondents Across Education and Income Levels

Figure 16: Support for Male and Female Candidates Across Qualifications (Higher Educated Male Respondents): Marginal Means (MM) Estimates and 95% Confidence Intervals (Choice)


Note that higher educated respondents are all respondents who have had some university education.

Figure 17: Support for Male and Female Candidates Across Qualifications (Less Educated Male Respondents): Marginal Means (MM) Estimates and 95% Confidence Intervals (Choice)

Note that less educated respondents are all respondents who have had some university education.

Figure 18: Support for Male and Female Candidates Across Qualifications (High Income Male Respondents): Marginal Means (MM) Estimates and 95% Confidence Intervals (Choice)

Note that higher income respondents are all respondents who report having a household income of at least AFN 100,000 (roughly USD 1,500 in August 2016) over the past year.

Figure 19: Support for Male and Female Candidates Across Qualifications (Lower Income Male Respondents): Marginal Means (MM) Estimates and 95% Confidence Intervals (Choice)

Note that lower income respondents are all respondents who report having a household income of less than AFN 100,000 (roughly USD 1,500 in August 2016) over the past

year.[17]

7.5 Qualifications and Support for Hazara Candidates Among Non-Hazara Respondents

Table 6: Marginal Means (MM): Preferences for Hazara and Non-Hazara Candidates

Candidate's Ethnicity	MM (SD)
Hazara	0.424
	(0.009)
Non-Hazara	0.518
	(0.002)
Observations	13746

---

17. Conversion rate from XE Historical Rate Tables https://www.xe.com/currencytables/?from=AFNdate=2016-10-01table-section, accessed on Oct. 6 2023.

Table 7: Marginal Means (MM): Preferences for Hazara and Non-Hazara Candidates Across Education Levels (Choice)

Candidate's Ethnicity	Less Educated	Higher Educated
Hazara	0.341	0.498
	(0.013)	(0.013)
Non-Hazara	0.426	0.600
	(0.006)	(0.005)
Observations	6524	7222

Table 8: Marginal Means (MM): Preferences for Hazara and Non-Hazara Candidates Across Education Levels (Rating; 1-5)

Candidate's Ethnicity	Lesser Educated	Higher Educated
Hazara	3.058	3.274
	(0.043)	(0.043)
Non-Hazara	3.208	3.583
	(0.021)	(0.020)
Observations	6524	7222

7.5.1 Robustness Checks

Figure 20: Non-Hazara Respondents' Preferences for Male and Female Candidates Across Qualifications: Average Marginal Component Estimates (AMCE) and 95% Confidence Intervals

Figure 21: Support for Hazara and Non-Hazara Candidates Across Qualifications and Location of Education: Marginal Means (MM) Estimates and 95% Confidence Intervals (Choice)

Figure 22: Support for Hazara and Non-Hazara Candidates Across Qualifications (Madrassa Education): Marginal Means (MM) Estimates and 95% Confidence Intervals (Choice)

Figure 23: Corrected Standard Error Estimates of MM Across Qualifications and Ethnicity

Note that the conjoint experiment did not have a repeated task. As a result, we set the Intra-Respondent Reliability (IRR) rate to the most common estimate of 0.75.

7.5.2 Among Non-Hazara Respondents Across Education and Income Levels

Figure 24: Support for Hazara and non-Hazara Candidates Across Qualifications (Higher Educated Non-Hazara Respondents): Marginal Means (MM) Estimates and 95% Confidence Intervals (Choice)

Note that higher educated respondents are all respondents who have had some university education.

Figure 25: Support for Hazara and non-Hazara Candidates Across Qualifications (Less Educated Non-Hazara Respondents): Marginal Means (MM) Estimates and 95% Confidence Intervals (Choice)

Note that less educated respondents are all respondents who have had some university education.

Figure 26: Support for Hazara and non-Hazara Candidates Across Qualifications (High Income Non-Hazara Respondents): Marginal Means (MM) Estimates and 95% Confidence Intervals (Choice)

Note that higher income respondents are all respondents who report having a household income of at least AFN 100,000 (roughly USD 1,500 in August 2016) over the past year.

Figure 27: Support for Hazara and non-Hazara Candidates Across Qualifications (Lower Income Non-Hazara Respondents): Marginal Means (MM) Estimates and 95% Confidence Intervals (Choice)


Note that lower income respondents are all respondents who report having a household income of less than AFN 100,000 (roughly USD 1,500 in August 2016) over the past year.

7.6 Qualifications and Support for Female Hazara Candidates Among Male Non-Hazara Respondents

Table 9: Marginal Means (MM): Preferences for Candidates Across Gender, Ethnicity and Levels of Education (Choice)

Candidate's Gender and Ethnicity	Less Educated	Higher Educated
Female Hazara	0.290 (0.027)	0.419 (0.028)
Female Non-Hazara	0.387 (0.013)	0.537 (0.014)
Male Hazara	0.378 (0.027)	0.525 (0.026)
Male Non-Hazara	0.476 (0.012)	0.654 (0.012)
Observations	3057	3297

Table 10: Marginal Means (MM): Preferences for Candidates Across Gender, Ethnicity and Levels of Education (Rating; 1-5)

Candidate's Gender and Ethnicity	Less Educated	Higher Educated
Female Hazara	2.879 (0.087)	2.893 (0.088)
Female Non-Hazara	3.119 (0.042)	3.390 (0.042)
Male Hazara	2.958 (0.082)	3.025 (0.084)
Male Non-Hazara	3.199 (0.041)	3.501 (0.040)
Observations	3057	3297

7.6.1 Robustness Checks

Figure 28: Non-Hazara Male Respondents' Preferences for Male and Female Candidates Across Qualifications: Average Marginal Component Estimates (AMCE) and 95% Confidence Intervals

Figure 29: Corrected Standard Error Estimates of MM Across Qualifications, Gender and Ethnicity

Note that the conjoint experiment did not have a repeated task. As a result, we set the Intra-Respondent Reliability (IRR) rate to the most common estimate of 0.75.

7.7 Women, Hazaras and Pashtuns' Leadership Preferences

Figure 30: Support for Male and Female Candidates (Female Respondents): Marginal Means (MM) Estimates and 95% Confidence Intervals

Figure 31: Support for Male and Female Candidates across Qualifications (Female Respondents): Marginal Means (MM) Estimates and 95% Confidence Intervals

Figure 32: Difference in Marginal Means (MM) estimates of Female Respondents' Choice of High vs. Low Qualified Candidates Across Genders (95% Confidence Intervals)

Figure 33: Difference in Marginal Means (MM) estimates of Female Respondents' Choice of Male vs Female Candidates Across Qualifications (95% Confidence Intervals)

Figure 34: Support for Male and Female Candidates Across Qualifications (Female Respondents): Average Marginal Component Estimates (AMCE) and 95% Confidence Intervals

Figure 35: Support for Hazara and Non-Hazara Candidates Across Qualifications (Hazara Respondents): Marginal Means (MM) Estimates and 95% Confidence Intervals

Figure 36: Support for Hazara and Non-Hazara Candidates Across Qualifications (Hazara Respondents): Estimated Differences in Marginal Means (MM) and 95% Confidence Intervals

Figure 37: Difference in Marginal Means (MM) estimates of Hazara Respondents' Choice of High vs. Low Qualified Candidates Across Ethnic Groups (95% Confidence Intervals)

Figure 38: Support for Hazara and Non-Hazara Candidates Across Qualifications (Hazara Respondents): Average Marginal Component Estimates (AMCE) and 95% Confidence Intervals

Figure 39: Support for Pashtun and Non-Pashtun Candidates Across Qualifications (Pashtun Respondents): Marginal Means (MM) Estimates and 95% Confidence Intervals

Figure 40: Support for Pashtun and Non-Pashtun Candidates Across Qualifications (Pashtun Respondents): Differences in Marginal Means (MM) Estimates and 95% Confidence Intervals

Figure 41: Support for Pashtun and Non-Pashtun Candidates Across Qualifications (Pashtun Respondents): Average Marginal Component Estimates (AMCE) and 95% Confidence Intervals

7.8 Other Ethnic Groups' Preferences

7.8.1 Out-Group Respondents

Figure 42: Marginal Means (MM) of Candidate Profile Selection Across Candidate Ethnic Groups (All Respondents)

Figure 43: Non-Pashtuns' Preferences for Pashtun and Non-Pashtun Candidates: Marginal Means (MM) Estimates and 95% Confidence Intervals

Figure 44: Non-Pashtuns' Preferences for Pashtun and Non-Pashtun Candidates Across

Qualifications: Marginal Means (MM) Estimates and 95% Confidence Intervals

Figure 45: Difference in Marginal Means (MM) estimates of Non-Pashtun Respondents'
Choice of High vs. Low Qualified Candidates Across Ethnic Groups (95% Confidence
Intervals)

Figure 46: Non-Tajiks' Preferences for Tajik and Non-Tajik Candidates: Marginal Means (MM) Estimates and 95% Confidence Intervals

Figure 47: Non-Tajiks' Preferences for Tajik and Non-Tajik Candidates Across Qualifications: Marginal Means (MM) Estimates and 95% Confidence Intervals

Figure 48: Difference in Marginal Means (MM) estimates of Non-Tajik Respondents' Choice of High vs. Low Qualified Candidates Across Ethnic Groups (95% Confidence Intervals)

Figure 49: Non-Turkmens' Preferences for Turkmen and Non-Turkmen Candidates: Marginal Means (MM) Estimates and 95% Confidence Intervals

Figure 50: Non-Turkmens' Preferences for Turkmen and Non-Turkmen Candidates Across Qualifications: Marginal Means (MM) Estimates and 95% Confidence Intervals

Figure 51: Difference in Marginal Means (MM) estimates of Non-Turkmen Respondents' Choice of High vs. Low Qualified Candidates Across Ethnic Groups (95% Confidence Intervals)

Figure 52: Non-Uzbeks' Preferences for Uzbek and Non-Uzbek Candidates: Marginal Means (MM) Estimates and 95% Confidence Intervals

Figure 53: Non-Uzbek' Preferences for Uzbek and Non-Uzbek Candidates Across Qualifications: Marginal Means (MM) Estimates and 95% Confidence Intervals

Figure 54: Difference in Marginal Means (MM) estimates of Non-Uzbek Respondents'
Choice of High vs. Low Qualified Candidates Across Ethnic Groups (95% Confidence
Intervals)

7.8.2 In-Group Respondents

Figure 55: Uzbeks' Preferences for Uzbek and Non-Uzbek Candidates: Marginal Means (MM) Estimates and 95% Confidence Intervals

Figure 56: Tajiks' Preferences for Tajik and Non-Tajik Candidates: Marginal Means (MM) Estimates and 95% Confidence Intervals

Figure 57: Turkmens' Preferences for Turkmen and Non-Turkmen Candidates: Marginal Means (MM) Estimates and 95% Confidence Intervals