

No Arab Bourgeoisie, No Democracy? The Entrepreneurial Middle Class and Democratic Attitudes since the Arab Spring

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Barrington Moore's statement "No bourgeoisie, no democracy" is one of the most famous maxims in comparative politics.¹ Since these words first appeared in 1966, the link between the rise of a bourgeoisie (or "middle class") and democracy has been explored in many contexts around the world.² But in the Middle East—a region stubbornly deprived of democratic governance—scholars have only recently begun to investigate the role of the middle class in the democratization process.³ Most of these studies, however, were conducted before the Arab Spring. How have the Arab middle class' attitudes toward democracy changed since these upheavals? Current Arab Spring scholarship examines the middle class by focusing on the disaffected urban and educated middle class youth, in addition to the unemployed. Yet, the region's small business community—a group that has long served as an agent of political change (as well as stasis) in many countries around the world—remains ignored.

This study examines the democratic attitudes of the Arab world's small business community before and after the start of the Arab Spring. We focus on "entrepreneurial" middle class actors, such as owners of small businesses, shopkeepers, grocers, and craftspeople.⁴ Although typically cast as anti-democratic, we argue that the economic strains leading up to the Arab Spring and the political ascendancy of historically small business-backed Islamist parties have led the region's entrepreneurial middle class to become generally more supportive of democracy than other segments of society. However, this support is likely to vary according to the presence and type of political upheaval that occurred in their countries during the Arab Spring. Small business owners in countries that saw governmental crisis or regime breakdown should be less supportive of democracy than their peers in more stable countries. We argue that this is because the instability created by pro-democracy movements is particularly deleterious to small enterprise.

We adopt a mixed methods approach to evaluate these hypotheses. We begin by analyzing the results from three waves of the Arab Barometer surveys (2006–2009,

2010–2011, and 2012–2014). All together, these datasets comprise more than 34,000 individuals, which include 3,075 small business owners across fourteen Arab countries. Our analysis generates a number of novel findings. First, we observe that small business owners became more pro-democratic on average after the start of the Arab Spring. This support, however, varies according to the degree of upheaval in an owner's country of residence. Small business owners in countries that saw intense political upheaval tend to hold more anti-democratic attitudes than owners in more stable countries. In these chaotic environments, small business owners were more likely to experience theft, job loss, or economic disruptions, and appear to be more skeptical of democracy than other occupational groups such as large firm owners or white-collar professionals.

We then delve deeper into the relationship between political upheaval and the democratic attitudes of small business owners by examining original interview data collected in Jordan, a country that saw large-scale protests and a governmental crisis during the Arab Spring. Interviews revealed that small business owners in Jordan largely support the notion of democracy in theory, but they fear the instability that democracy may bring in practice.

Our study helps fill a gap in the democracy literature by providing insights about the political attitudes of the Arab world's entrepreneurial middle class, specifically in reaction to the Arab Spring. It also sheds light on the political attitudes of a group that is often ignored in comparative politics: small business. While most researchers focus on business elites or large firms when analyzing the politics of the private sector, small-sized firms actually conduct most market transactions and absorb most of the labor force in the majority of countries, especially in the developing world.⁵ If we want to understand how the private sector thinks about democracy, we need to take a closer look at small business.

Democracy and the Private Sector

What role does the private sector play in democratization? Early democratic theory stressed the importance of a rising middle class as critical for democratization,⁶ a group that includes merchants, shopkeepers, craftspeople, and small-scale traders. Factors thought to lead to the formation of a rising middle class were urbanization, increasing literacy, and greater access to finance. The middle class was argued to provide an essential buffer between elites and the masses. In one respect, the middle class lessens the redistributive demands of the lower class; in another, it assuages the populist fears of the upper class.⁷

Other work on democracy highlights the importance of financial autonomy. Private sector actors' ability to produce and relocate their wealth (coupled with the state's need for revenue to fund war) incentivizes a trade-off between the state and capital. Capital agrees to taxes in exchange for market rights and political representation, giving birth to democracy.⁸ In this conceptualization, democracy stems not from economic development but represents a balance of power between capital and the state.

Moore's iconic statement "No bourgeoisie, no democracy" is connected to this line of reasoning, but he also argued that capitalists promote democracy mainly out of economic self-interest and not inherent democratic ideals. Although Moore's statement is often misinterpreted to suggest that capitalists always support democracy, in reality he shows that capitalists are often content with authoritarianism as long as their economic interests are protected. Particularly, if their profits depend on cheap labor, capitalists are unlikely to support expanding political rights beyond their own class. However, alliances between capitalists and workers in Europe were crucial to unseating political elites and paving the way for democracy.⁹

Eva Bellin explores whether and when capitalists and labor support democratization in developing countries.¹⁰ Bellin proposes that capitalists' support for democracy relies on their degree of dependence on the autocratic state and their fear of redistribution. Labor's support centers on its dependence on the state and the degree to which it receives state-backed privileges. In short, actors support democracy when it suits their interests.

Although Bellin's study has many virtues, it is difficult to apply her argument to the developing world's entrepreneurial middle class. For one, many members of the entrepreneurial middle class do not fall into neatly defined categories of capital or labor. Indeed, grocers, shop owners, and craftspeople share features of both capital and labor. Additionally, the vast majority of firms owned by middle class actors are too small to foster a politically-active labor movement. This may impede the rise of "shop floor politics" and all of the organizing, mobilizing, and bargaining that was vital to democratization in a number of contexts.¹¹ Furthermore, most members of the small business community lack connections to the state and the financial autonomy needed to leverage their political rights. They do not have the resources or time to lobby politicians, and they tend to be underrepresented (and misrepresented) in elite-dominated business associations.

What then might we expect from middle class members of the private sector? On the one hand, they often are disadvantaged in authoritarian systems because they lack the wealth and connections of "crony capitalists." Thus, democracy would theoretically give them more voice. They also tend to be poorer than "industrialists" and less dependent on labor. They therefore should be less averse to the redistributive consequences of democracy. Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John Stephens show that Europe's urban and rural petit bourgeoisie were historically the most significant allies of the working class. However, this alliance rested on two premises: the protection of capitalist infrastructure (rule of law and property rights) and the continuation of state protection. Here, as well, the petit bourgeoisie are contingent, if not opportunistic, democrats.

On the other hand, many studies portray small business owners as accommodating—if not supportive—of an authoritarian status quo. An Chen finds that small-scale entrepreneurs in China prefer a "liberal, oligarchic and relatively small state," but they also worry that extending rights to the uneducated and rural masses could negatively affect the economy.¹² In this sense, small-scale entrepreneurs mimic the richer

bourgeoisie and prefer to limit the expansion of political rights. Some small-scale entrepreneurs may benefit from the protection and patronage granted by an authoritarian state. Kenneth Shadlen argues that democratic rule in Mexico weakened small firms' political activism and influence, whereas they had more access to policymakers under a corporatist regime.¹³

Although most research on the Arab private sector focuses on business elites, those that address the region's small businesses strongly doubt these actors' democratic inclinations. The Arab petit bourgeoisie has been historically depicted as opponents of revolutionary causes and progenitors of a new state bourgeoisie.¹⁴ Some studies also highlight their conservative Islamist and anti-democratic tendencies.¹⁵ Research in Jordan and Morocco finds that non-elite businessmen "pursue the path of least resistance for achieving their individual business interests," which consequently means supporting elites in maintaining an authoritarian status quo.¹⁶

While the literature suggests that small business owners in the Arab world are largely skeptical about democratic reform, most of the existing studies employ case study methods that are limited to certain countries and time periods. The few that use cross-national surveys face their own limitations because most datasets (with the exception of the one used here) underrepresent business owners in the Arab world and were collected during periods of relative quiescence. We do not yet know if or how the Arab Spring affected small business owners. Our study combines insights from recent cross-national surveys with case-specific interview data, examining how the Arab Spring shaped small business owners' attitudes about democracy.

Hypotheses

Much of the Arab world was in upheaval in 2011. Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen saw leaders ousted from power and Syria descended into civil war. Protests rocked Algeria, Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, and Morocco. Although protests varied by country, they collectively strove to unseat authoritarian and corrupt governments. Based on the literature discussed above, our prior expectation is that the region's small business community would be largely opposed to these historic, pro-democracy upheavals. This is for two reasons. First, it was observed that small business owners often mimic the attitudes of business elites, who largely support an authoritarian status quo due to greater opportunities for rent-seeking and corruption. Second, small business owners are found to hold more conservative, traditional, and religious values compared to other subgroups of the population that are typically more pro-democratic, such as university students and white-collar professionals.

Yet, we argue that the Arab Spring should have shifted the attitudes of the region's small business community in favor of democracy. During the run-up to the uprisings, the region's mounting economic grievances and disparities strained small business owners' tolerance for the authoritarian status quo. In their analysis of the Arab Spring, Melani Cammett and Ishac Diwan argue that economic liberalization forged a more

autonomous and politically active middle class that consisted of professionals, industrialists, and small merchants.¹⁷ Giacomo Luciani also observed that small business owners belonged to the coalition of the marginalized that helped spark the protests and strove to break economic insiders' "stranglehold of economic opportunities."¹⁸ In a sense, the arrival of the Arab Spring highlighted the fact that years of tilted playing fields had frustrated the aspirations of the entrepreneurial middle class, which pushed these individuals closer to an alliance with poorer segments of society against their regime.

The Arab Spring was also a crucial window of opportunity for conservative and religious movements to gain a foothold in national politics through democratic processes. Many small business owners would have viewed this unprecedented moment in the region's political history in a positive way, given that they are often noted in the literature as holding more conservative, traditional, or religious values compared to other subgroups of the population. During the 1950s in Egypt, many small merchants and craftspeople were active in the underground Muslim Brotherhood.¹⁹ Small merchants and entrepreneurs also played a key role in the Islamic opposition in Algeria in the 1990s.²⁰ In Syria, interventionist policies by the ruling Ba'ath party isolated many small business owners, which helped turn the *souq* into a natural ally of the Muslim Brotherhood and a catalyst for urban unrest.²¹ Indeed, the region's history is replete with examples of merchant communities sharing close social ties and networks with religious leaders and institutions.²²

During the Arab Spring, religious-based parties were emboldened by the protests and saw the rise of democracy as a rare opportunity to bring their leaders to office. The most vivid example of this was in Egypt. After the 2011 revolution, the Muslim Brotherhood dominated parliamentary elections and their candidate Mohamed Morsi became president. Although his leadership was short lived, the Arab Spring enabled Egypt's religious conservatives to play a greater role in Egyptian politics.²³ Similar dynamics emerged in Morocco, Tunisia, and (for a time) Algeria. As many have observed, the Arab Spring highlighted the notion that support for religious-based parties is not necessarily equated with anti-democratic inclinations. Olivier Roy noted this development:

Since the Arab uprising . . . political Islam and democracy have become increasingly interdependent. [. . .] Neither can now survive without the other. In countries undergoing transitions, the only way for Islamists to maintain their legitimacy is through elections.²⁴

In effect, the Arab Spring altered two factors typically thought to discourage democratic support among the small business community: the acceptance of authoritarianism in exchange for growth and an affiliation with conservative Islamist parties.

Based on the above logic, we posit the following hypothesis:

H1: All else equal, small business owners should have more positive attitudes about democracy after the start of the Arab Spring compared with prior.

Notwithstanding the above, even casual observers of the region will note that, as of writing, the Arab Spring failed to produce democracy in nearly every case (the tentative

exception is Tunisia). Instead, political instability has weakened many of the region's frail economies and led to conflict in some of the more fragile states. For much of 2011–2012, protests and violent standoffs between activists and government forces rocked cities and provinces across the region. To date, multiple governments in Egypt and Yemen have been overthrown. Western intervention toppled Libya's dictatorship. Syria is in the midst of civil war.

Political chaos is bad for business. It is especially bad for small business owners, who tend to have few assets, little savings, limited options for affordable credit, and operate in a highly competitive environment. Political instability also discourages investment in physical and human capital, increases inflation, and renders government policymaking unpredictable.²⁵ If political instability persists over time, it can prevent the government from effectively controlling the rise of illegal activities such as smuggling. This disproportionately harms local traders and small manufacturers, who suddenly face a market flooded with cheaper, smuggled goods.

Consequently, we expect support for democracy among small business owners to vary according to the presence and type of political instability that occurred during the Arab Spring. Small business owners in places that saw intense violence and total regime breakdown should be less likely to support democratization given these events' especially deleterious effects on business conditions. Small business owners in places that saw less violence, but still large-scale protests and a governmental crisis, similarly should have witnessed a threat to their ability to conduct business. These owners may even be more concerned that ongoing pro-democracy movements will push their country closer toward the violence and upheaval that has afflicted some of their neighbors.

Based on the above logic, we posit a second hypothesis:

H2: All else equal, small business owners in countries that experienced substantial political instability during the Arab Spring should have more negative attitudes about democracy than owners in more stable countries.

Next, we test these hypotheses and present additional findings based on an analysis of survey data from the Arab Barometer. We then turn to fieldwork conducted in Jordan for insights into how the small business community reacts to large-scale protests and a governmental crisis.

Survey Data and Analysis

The Arab Barometer is the most comprehensive set of surveys that tracks citizen attitudes, values, and behaviors in the Arab world (see <http://www.arabbarometer.org>). The Arab Barometer has conducted three waves of surveys to date (wave 1 was in 2006–2009, wave 2 was in 2010–2011, and wave 3 was in 2012–2014).²⁶ This comprises more than 34,000 individuals, which includes 3,075 small business owners across fourteen Arab countries. Small business owners are individuals who self-identify

as either an employer/director of an institution with fewer than ten employees, an owner of a shop or grocery store, or a craftsperson. The numbers of small business owners from each country in the dataset are as follows: Algeria (199), Bahrain (14), Egypt (275), Iraq (187), Jordan (311), Kuwait (82), Lebanon (960), Libya (31), Morocco (110), Palestine (West Bank and Gaza) (271), Saudi Arabia (98), Sudan (192), Tunisia (218), and Yemen (127). Of these countries, six were surveyed before and after the start of the Arab Spring: Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, and Yemen.

We begin by examining the broad differences in democratic attitudes between small business owners and all other individuals prior to and after the start of the Arab Spring. We select survey questions that have identical or nearly identical wording across survey waves. The first question pertains to a respondent's evaluation of the "suitability" of democracy for their country (0 to 10 scale, "absolutely inappropriate" to "completely appropriate"). The second question asks respondents if they agree with the statement: "Under democracy, economic performance is weak" (four-item Likert scale, "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree"). The third question asks if they agree with the statement: "Democratic regimes are indecisive and full of problems" (four-item Likert scale, "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree"). The fourth question asks if they agree with the statement: "Democracies are not effective at maintaining order and stability" (four-item Likert scale, "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree"). The fifth question asks if they agree with the statement: "A democratic system may have problems, yet it is better than other systems" (four-item Likert scale, "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree"). The final two questions ask whether democracy and autocracy are "good" or "bad" political systems (1 to 4 scale, "very bad" to "very good").

Table 1 presents the mean responses and *t*-test results for each of the seven questions using data from countries that were surveyed before and after the start of the Arab Spring. The table reveals that, prior to the Arab Spring, small business owners held mixed attitudes about democracy on average compared to other individuals (column 3). While they were more skeptical about the suitability of democracy for their country and more likely to view democratic regimes as indecisive and unstable, they also generally preferred democracy to autocracy as a political system. However, after the start of the Arab Spring, small business owners exhibit more pro-democratic attitudes on average compared to other individuals. They are more likely to disagree that democracies are indecisive, unstable, or have weak economic performance. They view democracy as better than other systems and are more likely to see democracy as "good" and autocracy as "bad." With the exception of the suitability question, small business owners always display more pro-democratic attitudes on average compared to others, and the differences in means are statistically significant at a level of 0.01 or better (column 6). More importantly, we find that small business owners, as a group, became more pro-democratic on average after the start of the Arab Spring (column 7). In six of the seven questions, their mean responses shifted in favor of democracy after the start of the Arab Spring, and these differences are all statistically significant at a level of 0.01 or better.²⁷


Table 1 Mean Responses and *t*-Test Results for Democracy Questions

	Before the Arab Spring			After the Start of the Arab Spring			Difference in means for Small Business Owners (After Start – Before Start) (7)
	Small Business Owner	All others	Difference in means (SBO-others)	Small Business Owner	All others	Difference in means (SBO-others)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
Democracy is Suitable (0 to 10)	5.946 (514)	6.533 (7,712)	-0.587 ***	5.973 (1,385)	5.864 (9,354)	0.109 *	0.027
Democracy = Weak Economy (1 to 4)	2.203 (516)	2.229 (7,681)	-0.026	2.056 (1,368)	2.218 (9,054)	-0.162 ***	-0.147 ***
Democracy = Indecisive (1 to 4)	2.576 (517)	2.414 (7,679)	0.162 ***	2.182 (1,377)	2.271 (9,107)	-0.089 ***	-0.394 ***
Democracy = Instability (1 to 4)	2.287 (516)	2.229 (7,629)	0.058 *	2.11 (1,371)	2.193 (9,100)	-0.083 ***	-0.177 ***
Democracy = Best Option (1 to 4)	3.155 (516)	3.159 (7,860)	-0.004	3.282 (1,378)	3.034 (9,109)	0.248 ***	0.127 ***
Democracy = Good (1 to 4)	3.404 (527)	3.331 (7,997)	0.073 **	3.514 (1,413)	3.375 (9,554)	0.139 ***	0.11 ***
Autocracy = Good (1 to 4)	1.693 (525)	1.759 (7,890)	-0.066 **	1.427 (1,402)	1.544 (9,390)	-0.117 ***	-0.266 ***

Note: Independent sample *t*-tests used (*- sig. at 0.1, **- sig. at 0.05, ***- sig. at 0.01). The number of observations are indicated in parentheses. Variables are coded so that higher values indicate the respondent agrees more with the statement.

Examining group means and conducting *t*-tests are useful ways to view broad differences across subgroups of a population, but regression analysis is required to isolate relationships and control for other factors that are important in explaining attitudes about democracy. In Figure 1, we present the results from regression models that employ each of the seven democracy questions as the dependent variable. The independent variables used in the regression models are the following: a dummy variable to indicate status as a small business owner, age, gender,²⁸ educational attainment level, marital status,²⁹ and household income.³⁰ Given the presence of missing data and without a realistic strategy for imputation, these independent variables were best suited to maximize the number of small business owners in the sample. The black, square-shaped plots in Figure 1 denote the findings for data collected prior to the Arab Spring. The grey, diamond-shaped plots denote the findings for data collected after

Figure 1 a-g Small Business Owners (SBOs) and Factors that Shape Democratic Attitudes, Coefficients and SEs



the start of the Arab Spring (refer to the Online Appendix for descriptive statistics, full regression tables, and additional notes about data coding).³¹

Figure 1a displays the coefficient values when the dependent variable is a respondent's evaluation of the suitability of democracy for their country. We estimate an OLS regression with country fixed effects and robust standard errors (country fixed effects results not displayed). As Figure 1a reveals, small business owners prior to the Arab Spring were less likely to believe that democracy is suitable for their country compared to others in the population ($p < 0.001$). However, after the start of the Arab Spring, small business owners were more likely to believe that democracy is suitable for their country compared to others ($p < 0.037$). Although the findings in Table 1 suggested that attitudes about the suitability of democracy weakened as a whole after the Arab Spring, these results indicate that small business owners remained more optimistic about the suitability of democracy than others.

Figures 1b through 1e reveal similar patterns in small business owners' support for democracy since the start of the Arab Spring. Ordered logit models are estimated with country fixed effects and robust standard errors (country fixed effects results not displayed). As Figure 1b shows, small business owners prior to the Arab Spring seem more likely to agree that democracies have weak economic performance, but the coefficient is insignificant. After the Arab Spring, however, small business owners are less likely to agree with this statement and the coefficient is statistically significant ($p < 0.015$). Figure 1c indicates that small business owners prior to the Arab Spring were statistically significantly more likely to agree that democratic regimes are indecisive and full of problems ($p < 0.007$). Yet, after the Arab Spring, the coefficient is negative and insignificant. The findings are similar in Figure 1d regarding the ability of democracies to maintain order and stability. A shift in favor of democracy is also evident in Figure 1e regarding the question "A democratic system may have problems, yet it is better than other systems." After the start of the Arab Spring, small business owners were more likely to agree with this statement ($p < 0.001$). Finally, small business owners appear no more nor less likely to view democracy as "good," but they are less likely to view autocracy as "good" after the start of the Arab Spring ($p < 0.001$).

Taken together, the t -tests and regression results largely confirm our first hypothesis that the Arab world's small business community became more supportive of democratic governance after the start of the Arab Spring. Before the uprisings, small business owners were more likely than the average individual to believe that democracy is unsuitable for their country, an indecisive form of government, and ineffective at maintaining stability. After the start of the Arab Spring, they display more positive sentiments about democracy. They are more likely than the average individual to hold that democracy is suitable for their country and that autocracy is not a good political system. They also are less likely to view democracy as leading to weak economic performance and more likely to view it as the best option in spite of its problems.

Although small business owners' democratic attitudes grew more positive after the start of the Arab Spring, our second hypothesis holds that they should be less enthusiastic about democracy in countries that experienced substantial political


instability. Due to the nature of the data available, we cannot effectively compare how small business owners' attitudes changed in unstable versus stable countries pre- and post-Arab Spring. However, we can examine differences in attitudes among unstable versus stable countries since the start of the Arab Spring. Survey waves 2 and 3 contain data for eleven Arab countries that vary in the extent to which their governments experienced crisis and/or total breakdown. Although every country in the dataset (at the time of data collection) saw protest activity during this period, in only some countries did the government experience a total breakdown or make major concessions to protestors after sustained mass mobilization.

Next, we limit our sample to small business owners and include two additional dummy variables in the regression models: *Crisis* and *Breakdown*. *Crisis* is coded "1" if there were large-scale protests and a governmental crisis immediately before or during the period of data collection (as detailed in the master codebooks) but without a regime breakdown. This corresponds to Algeria (wave 2 only), Jordan (wave 3 only), Morocco (wave 3), and Yemen (wave 2 only). All other cases were coded "0." *Breakdown* is coded "1" if there was a total governmental breakdown before or during the period of data collection and "0" for all else. This corresponds to Egypt (waves 2 and 3), Libya (wave 3), Tunisia (waves 2 and 3), and Yemen (wave 3 only). The non-crisis/breakdown countries are Algeria (wave 3 only), Kuwait (waves 2 and 3), Lebanon (waves 2 and 3), Saudi Arabia (wave 2), and Sudan (waves 2 and 3).³² As a robustness check, an ordinal "unrest" measure was substituted (coded "0" for no crisis/breakdown, "1" for crisis, and "2" for breakdown).

Figures 2a through 2f display the odds ratios for *Crisis* and *Breakdown* when ordered logistic regressions are ran using the same independent variables as previously (refer also to Online Appendix Table 4A). Figure 2a displays the results when the dependent variable is a respondent's answer to the statement "Under democracy, economic performance is weak." Small business owners in countries that experienced a governmental crisis or total breakdown are more likely to agree with this statement than owners in the no crisis/breakdown countries. Owners in the crisis countries are also more likely to view democracy as indecisive and inherently unstable. Although owners in the breakdown countries lean negative in these areas, the results are marginally significant only with respect to instability. Yet, owners in both the crisis and breakdown countries are more likely than those in the stable countries to disagree with the statement "A democratic system may have problems, yet it is better than other systems." Finally, owners in both the crisis and breakdown countries are less likely to view democracy as a "good" system and more likely to view autocracy as a "good" system.³³

These findings reveal nuanced variation in the democratic attitudes of small business owners after the start of the Arab Spring. Even though the attitudes of these actors about democracy became more positive as a whole, there are important differences according to the presence and type of instability that took place in an owner's country of residence. Small business owners in countries that saw governmental crisis or total breakdown hold more negative attitudes about democracy than small business owners in countries that did not experience such instability.


Figure 2 a-f Democratic Attitudes among Small Business Owners in Countries that Experience Crisis or Breakdown, Odds Ratios



Why is this so? It may be due to the fact that owners in crisis and breakdown countries witnessed greater threats upon their ability to conduct business. Additional analysis of the wave 3 surveys sheds some light on this issue. Respondents in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen were asked if they personally experienced negative economic outcomes as a result of the Arab Spring demonstrations. If we compare the group means, we find that small business owners were more likely than all other respondents to report “Destruction of place of work or residence” (11 percent versus 8 percent), “Theft or loss of personal belongings” (21 percent versus 13 percent), and “Loss of job or a subsidy” (12 percent versus 9 percent). These differences are all statistically significant in independent sample *t*-tests ($p < 0.05$).

Logistic regression using these answers as dependent variables reveals that in three of the four cases, small business owners are positively and statistically significantly associated with experiencing loss or destruction during the Arab Spring. Figures 3a-3d display the main results (refer also to Online Appendix Table 5A). To be sure, these findings should not come as a surprise. Because most owners run businesses in public areas, we would expect them to be more vulnerable to theft, workplace destruction, and job loss during large-scale protests. Nevertheless, confirmation of this relationship helps identify one important reason why small business owners in these countries may be

Figure 3 a-d Small Business Owners (SBOs) and Factors Associated with Experiencing Loss/Destruction during the Arab Spring, Coefficients and SEs



more skeptical about democracy: for all its political aspirations, the Arab Spring threatened small business owners' livelihoods.

Furthermore, it appears that small business owners in the crisis and breakdown countries exhibit more negative attitudes about democracy than members of other important occupational groups on average. Small business owners in these countries tend to hold more negative views about democracy than owners of larger firms (ten employees or more) and white-collar professionals (lawyers, accountants, teachers, doctors, etc.). In six of the seven democracy questions, the difference of means *t*-tests are statistically significant at a level of 0.05 or better, and the direction of the differences are consistent with small business owners possessing less favorable attitudes about democracy (results presented in Online Appendix Table 6A).

In order to delve deeper into why small business owners in places that saw political instability hold reservations about democracy, we next present the results of interviews conducted in 2014 with fifty small business owners in Jordan. While these interviews

are only snapshots of small business owners' attitudes in a country that experienced large-scale protests, they illustrate and corroborate the contingency of their democratic loyalties. We find that Jordan's entrepreneurial middle class longs for the fairer, more responsive governance that democracy assures in theory, but they worry about the societal discord and economic instability that democracy may bring in practice.

Attitudes about Democracy among Jordan's Entrepreneurial Middle Class

Jordan is an ideal case to study the democratic attitudes of the Arab world's entrepreneurial middle class. Politically, Jordan's constitutional monarchy shares its neighbors' autocratic tendencies. It is consistently ranked in Freedom House's (2015) "not free" category due to substantial restrictions on political rights and civil liberties.³⁴ Economically, Jordan's per capita income is close to the region's median, and its small-sized firms (those with fewer than ten employees) represent a dominant share of all registered firms (roughly 90 percent), consistent with other Arab states.³⁵ During the Arab Spring, the Jordanian monarchy confronted large-scale protests that sparked a governmental crisis during 2011–2012. King Abdullah II was forced to dismiss a series of prime ministers and dissolved parliament in October 2012.³⁶ The next year, almost 900 labor-related protests erupted, more than four times as many as occurred in 2010.³⁷ In addition to these domestic disturbances, crises in neighboring Iraq and Syria have made many Jordanians cynical and wary of mass-led calls for democratic reform.

In the summer of 2014, we interviewed fifty small business owners across four cities in Jordan to better understand their democratic attitudes since the Arab Spring. To reach a representative sample of small business owners across sectors, we adopted a sampling method based on 2012 demographic and economic data from the Jordanian Department of Statistics.³⁸ Small business owners were defined as owners of firms or stalls in fixed locations with fewer than ten employees. Two-thirds of respondents resided in the capital Amman (29) while the remaining lived in Jordan's next largest regional cities: Irbid (10), Zarqa (7), and Karak (4). More than half of the respondents worked in the retail/wholesale trade sector (27), and the remaining were in manufacturing (8), tourism/hospitality (7), traditional crafts (6), and health services (2).³⁹ Respondents were a highly heterogeneous group, suggesting low selection bias.⁴⁰ The youngest owner was twenty-one years old and the oldest was seventy-three. Their level of education spanned from middle school to the doctoral level. They came from a variety of professional backgrounds before becoming business owners: private sector employment, civil service, medicine, or construction. 84 percent of respondents were male.⁴¹

We asked small business owners whether they believed democracy was suitable for Jordan, what they felt were the most important features of democracy, how democratization could affect their businesses, and how the country's recent protests and political unrest impacted their businesses. Overall, many owners expressed support for democratization in theory; however, they worried about democratization in practice.

Fears of instability and discord—in part fueled by the upheavals in neighboring Syria and Iraq—outweighed the hypothetical gains that democracy could bring to Jordan's small business community.

Nevertheless, most small business owners believed that democratization would benefit the country's small business community. Democracy was associated with better economic management,⁴² less corruption,⁴³ less reliance on *wasta* (or "connections"),⁴⁴ and stronger professional associations.⁴⁵ Many argued that democratic rule would make Jordan's government more responsive to the plight of small firms,⁴⁶ whether in terms of greater protection against cheap imports,⁴⁷ or fairer legislation vis-à-vis large firms.⁴⁸ A number of owners vented about how they felt the playing field was unfairly tilted toward large firms and business elites. For instance, the owner of a furniture store in Zarqa complained, "Right now parliament only serves the interests of big bosses."⁴⁹ A craftsman in Amman explained, "Yes, a more representative and independent parliament could help us profit. For example, rather than giving the sales rights of the Amman Citadel to big traders, the government could have consulted with us and given us a chance to sell our goods there too."⁵⁰

Small business owners often spoke of democracy in terms of the "freedoms" that it could bring to Jordanian society. However, many stressed the need to place these freedoms within cultural and Islamic boundaries. A retail store owner in Irbid said, "There can be too much freedom. Democracy needs to be shaped by Islamic concepts and conditioned to the needs of this conservative Islamic society."⁵¹ The owner of an optical goods store in Amman argued, "True democracy is found in the Shura and with Islam."⁵² Another added, "Real democracy is practicing Islam truthfully. Real religion, not extremism, is the most democratic thing in the world."⁵³ Thus, many small business owners in Jordan believe that Islam is not only compatible but essential to democratic rule.

Owners were quick to add, however, that they were unsure if Jordanian society was ready for democracy.⁵⁴ Some doubted whether democracy would lead politicians to adopt meaningful reforms that would help Jordan's small business community.⁵⁵ Many argued that Jordan is "too tribal" for democracy to work.⁵⁶ The owner of a watch store in Zarqa explained, "Because parliamentarians are elected by their tribe, it is impossible to have an independent and representative parliament in Jordan."⁵⁷ A furniture store owner said, "A more representative parliament might help us, maybe. If their hearts were with the people, maybe. Right now, they don't care about us. Parliamentarians only care about their own interests."⁵⁸

Some small business owners blamed the public, instead of politicians, for the absence of democracy in Jordan. A café owner in Amman explained, "The problem is not with the government or parliament. It's with the people."⁵⁹ The owner of a pharmacy in Karak said that the public is not yet educated or politically informed enough to hold its representatives accountable.⁶⁰ A potter in Amman confessed, "I hate to admit this . . . but a state deserves the government it has,"⁶¹ and a craftsman asked, "How can I demand political reform without reforming myself and living in a real democratic way?"⁶² In addition, there were fears about increased communalism in the

wake of democratization.⁶³ An owner of a furniture store feared that democracy could empower a tribalist mentality that would place Jordanians of Palestinian descent like himself at risk.⁶⁴ At the same time, an owner of a clothing store worried that democracy would enable Jordanians of Palestinian descent to pass laws that would threaten Jordanians of East Bank origins.⁶⁵

Many small business owners expressed support for democracy in theory, but they consistently invoked the potential costs a democracy movement could impose on Jordan's business environment. A number of owners connected the Arab Spring and the ensuing crises in the region to the country's deteriorating business environment. One owner stated:

We are paying and our businesses are suffering from the instability of our neighbors. Jordan does not have the resources to deal with the uncertainty of political reform. Syria and Egypt will always have resources to build on. We don't. The Arab Spring has ruined our economy.⁶⁶

Many complained about the disruptions to their businesses due to the protests.⁶⁷ Although some sympathized with the protestors,⁶⁸ most stressed that the protests were ultimately bad for business.⁶⁹ Some owners were irritated that political movements were seeking to capitalize on the economic instability caused by labor protests.⁷⁰ None of them distinguished between labor protests and the more political, pro-democracy protests.

Small business owners commonly framed democracy in terms of the political upheavals next door. A hardware store owner in Irbid said, "If demands for democratic reform lead to instability like in Syria, then I don't want it."⁷¹ Similarly, a salon owner in Amman reflected, "When I hear people talk about political reform, I think about Gaza and killings in Iraq and across the region. The most important thing is that we in Jordan are lucky to still live in coexistence."⁷² A craftsman in Amman said, "We don't want democracy imported from the West. The democracy in the West kills people."⁷³ The owner of an optical goods store in Amman observed, "The Western concept of democracy has brought so much instability to the region. This foreign democracy has destroyed many societies."⁷⁴

Indeed, when listing what they felt were the most important features of democracy, owners routinely cited "security" and "stability." A few listed "public representation," "public participation," or "state responsiveness to the people." Only two of the fifty owners interviewed said that "free and fair elections" were among the most important features of a democracy. This helps confirm that the functional aspects of democracy (i.e., elections and a clearly-defined relationship between government and the people) appear less important for Jordan's small business owners today than the need to establish a secure and stable society.

Taken as a whole, these interviews help clarify how the political instability associated with ongoing protests and a governmental crisis have shaped the democratic attitudes of the entrepreneurial middle class. While many small business owners articulated support for democracy in theory, they remained deeply concerned about the

economic and social ramifications of democracy in practice. This divergence in attitudes toward democracy in theory and practice is consistent with our second hypothesis, as we would expect small business owners in turbulent locales to place a premium on stability. Those in less turbulent locales should be more likely to prioritize the economic and social gains of democratization. Our interviews suggest that many of Jordan's small business community are skeptical about democracy largely because of their exposure to the domestic and regional consequences of the Arab Spring. Given their country's proximity to failed and violent democratization efforts in Syria, Iraq, and even Palestine, Jordanian small business owners' contingent democratic affinities may be especially pronounced.

Nevertheless, many of the region's middle class entrepreneurs must balance their aspirations for political change with the increasingly harsh realities of doing business in the Arab world. There are likely to be long-term consequences if these contingent attitudes persist. The continued premium on stability may render the small business community an unlikely catalyst for political reform in Jordan.

Conclusion

Combining cross-country survey data with in-depth fieldwork, this study sheds new light on the democratic attitudes of the Arab world's entrepreneurial middle class. In contrast to much of the literature on small business politics in the Middle East, we find that the region's small business owners have generally become more supportive of democratic governance in the wake of the Arab Spring and tend to be more supportive of democracy than the average individual. However, this support varies according to the presence and types of political upheavals that occurred in their country. Small business owners in countries that saw substantial upheaval were less supportive of democracy than their peers in more stable states and fellow citizens in other professions.

Future research should probe deeper into the political ramifications of the entrepreneurial middle class' democratic attitudes, particularly in the crisis and breakdown countries. Given the urban nature of many of the Arab Spring protests, this vital subset of the population may have had a significant influence on the ensuing political outcomes we see today. As the region's largest private sector employers, small business owners' attitudes toward democracy may directly influence their employees' political opinions and activism. Differentiating the political behavior and attitudes of small business owners across "successful" (i.e., Tunisia) and "failed" cases (e.g., Egypt, Libya, and Yemen) could help clarify how small business owners influenced the region's democratic outcomes.

Further disaggregation of the different types of small businesses can also help expose important variation among owners. Indeed, political upheaval does not affect all small businesses equally. We expect a sector like tourism to be much more affected by ongoing political instability than manufacturing. Exploring the differences between

various subgroups within the small business community can help paint a more nuanced picture of the democratic inclinations of this omnipresent and multi-faceted class.

It bears repeating that the Arab world remains in transition. Political attitudes, much less democratic attitudes, are still in flux. As internal and external strains continue to recast social contracts between citizen and state in the Middle East, we expect the entrepreneurial middle class to continue balancing their desires for equitable and accountable rule with the necessities for economic survival.

NOTES

The authors would like to thank Walid Alkhatib, Ben Ansell, Amaney Jamal, Malik Mufti, Zu'bi Al-Zu'bi, and participants at the 2013 MPSA conference for their feedback. We thank Shaherah Khatabeh for excellent research assistance and the Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan and the Amman Center for Oriental Research for allowing us to use their facilities while conducting fieldwork.

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26. *Arab Barometer*, Survey Data (2016). Refer also to Mark Tessler, Amaney Jamal, and Michael Robbins, "New Findings on Arabs and Democracy," *Journal of Democracy*, 23 (October 2012), 89–103.
27. The pre-/peri/post *t*-test results for small business owners are the same (save one exception) when data from all countries are pooled (which includes the countries Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Tunisia). The exception occurs with "Democracy=Best Option," where the peri/post-Spring mean is higher than the pre-Spring mean, but the difference is insignificant.
28. Gender is coded "0" for male and "1" for female.
29. Marital status is coded "0" for unmarried and "1" for married.
30. Controlling for a country's GDP per capita leads to multicollinearity because this variable is highly correlated with the country dummy variables (note also an oil rents measure is nearly perfectly correlated with GDP per capita). Omitting the GDP per capita variable does not alter the main results but omitting the country dummy variables would result in a specification error.
31. Due to space constraints, the Appendix is not in the print version of this article. It can be viewed in the online version, at www.ingentaconnect.com/cuny/cp.
32. In the results presented, Iraq and Palestine were omitted from the analysis because the cause of their instability is unique and not the result of events associated with the Arab Spring. When the regressions are rerun including Iraq and Palestine in the sample (coded "0" for the "Crisis" and "Breakdown" variables), the results are the same with only two exceptions. These exceptions are for the "Breakdown" variable in the

regressions for “Democracy=Weak Economy” and “Democracy=Good” (coefficient is in the same direction but insignificant). Note that re-coding Algeria (wave 2) as “0” instead of “1” for the “Crisis” variable produces the same results with the only exception of “Democracy=Good” (coefficient is in the same direction but insignificant).

33. When the ordinal “unrest” measure is substituted, the coefficient is positive and statistically significant at a level of 0.02 or better in all cases with one exception. This is with respect to “Democracy=Indecisive,” where the coefficient is in the same direction but insignificant. However, this model fails the Chi-squared goodness of fit test.

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36. For more analysis see Sarah Tobin, “Jordan’s Arab Spring: The Middle Class and Anti-revolution,” *Middle East Policy*, 19 (Spring 2012), 96–109.

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39. Transport and household services were excluded because the majority of these individuals are self-employed with no employees and often located in the informal sector.

40. Respondents were selected by starting each day near the center of a city and randomly selecting stores in the targeted industries. Interviews were conducted in Arabic and at different times/days in order to avoid peak hours of business. The rejection rate was 17 percent.

41. A female research assistant interviewed the female entrepreneurs.

42. Interviews with restaurant owner, Irbid, 8/5/2014; blacksmith, Irbid, 8/5/2014.

43. Interview with perfume store owner, Irbid, 8/5/2014.

44. Interview with restaurant owner, Amman, 8/6/2014.

45. Interview with pharmacy owner, Karak, 8/10/2014.

46. Interviews with carpenter, Irbid, 8/5/2014; retail store owner, Irbid, 8/5/2014; coffee shop owners, Amman, 8/7/2014; craftsman, Amman, 8/8/2014.

47. Interviews with furniture store owner, Amman, 8/4/2014; craftsman, Amman, 8/8/2014.

48. Interviews with optical goods store owner, Amman, 8/4/2014; carpenter store owner, Irbid, 8/5/2014; retail store owner, Zarqa, 8/9/2014.

49. Interview with furniture store owner, Zarqa, 8/5/2014.

50. Interview with craftsman, Amman, 8/6/2014.

51. Interview with retail store owner, Irbid, 8/5/2014.

52. Interview with optical goods store owner, Amman, 8/4/2014.

53. Interview with craftsman, Amman, 8/6/2014.

54. Interviews with perfume store owner, Irbid, 8/5/2014; clothing store owner, Amman, 8/3/2014.

55. Interviews with salon owner, Amman, 8/7/2014; cell phone store owner, Irbid, 8/5/2014.

56. Interviews with watch store owner, Zarqa, 8/9/2014; clothing store owner, Karak, 8/10/2014; tailor, Karak, 8/10/2014; coffee shop owner, Amman, 8/3/2014.

57. Interview with watch store owner, Zarqa, 8/9/2014.

58. Interview with furniture store owner, Zarqa, 8/9/2014.

59. Interview with café owner, Amman, 8/7/2014.

60. Interview with pharmacy owner, Karak, 8/10/2014.

61. Interview with potter, Amman, 8/8/2014.

62. Interview with craftsman, Amman, 8/6/2014.

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64. Interview with furniture store owner, Amman, 8/4/2014.

65. Interview with clothing store owner, Amman, 8/3/2014.

66. Interview with blacksmith, Irbid, 8/5/2014; also carpet store owner, Karak, 8/10/2014; retail store owner, Karak, 8/10/2014.

67. Interviews with retail store owner, Amman, 8/3/2014; clothing store owner, Karak, 8/10/2014; carpet store owner, Karak, 8/10/2014.

68. Interview with tailor, Karak, 8/10/2014.

69. Interviews with clothing store owner, Amman, 8/3/2014; carpet store owner, Karak, 8/10/2014.

70. Interview with blacksmith, Irbid, 8/5/2014.
71. Interview with hardware store owner, Irbid, 8/5/2014.
72. Interview with salon owner, Amman, 8/7/2014.
73. Interview with craftsman, Amman, 8/6/2014.
74. Interview with optical goods store owner, Amman, 8/4/2014.

APPENDIX

Online Appendix Note 1: Additional Information about the Coding of Arab Barometer Data

- All of the wave 3 surveys and most of the wave 2 surveys were conducted after the start of the Tunisia protests in December 2010. For four of the 11 countries in wave 2 (Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, and Sudan) the surveys began just weeks prior to the start of the Tunisia protests, but in two of them (Lebanon and Sudan) additional surveys were conducted after December 2010. The surveys for Jordan and Palestine were completed before the start of the Tunisia protests. For more details on the timing of the surveys, refer to Mark Tessler, Amaney Jamal, and Michael Robbins, “New Findings on Arabs and Democracy,” *Journal of Democracy*, 23 (October 2012), 89–103.
- Since the Arab Barometer surveys were conducted at households and places of residence—not at a respondent’s place of business—all of the occupational information was self-reported. The surveys do not indicate if the business is in a fixed location or legally registered.
- Tunisia and Yemen have slightly different categories of educational attainment than the other Arab states. The values for these countries were re-coded to best match with the others. For more details, refer to the master codebooks at Arab Barometer, 2016.
- Household income data were re-coded on a 1 to 4 scale with increasing values reflecting a greater ability to cover household expenses and save (based on question *q1016* in waves 2 and 3). Since the income measures for wave 1 were different (a decile measure), we matched these to a 1 to 4 scale.

Table 1A Descriptive Statistics

	Obs.	Mean	SD	Min	Max
<i>Democracy is Suitable</i>	31,909	6.037	2.867	0	10
<i>Democracy = Weak Economy</i>	30,980	2.18	0.888	1	4
<i>Democracy = Indecisive</i>	31,114	2.299	0.88	1	4
<i>Democracy = Instability</i>	30,961	2.197	0.864	1	4
<i>Democracy = Best Option</i>	31,420	3.079	0.793	1	4
<i>Democracy = Good</i>	32,684	3.3942	0.732	1	4
<i>Autocracy = Good</i>	32,284	1.605	0.803	1	4
<i>Small Business Owner</i>	34,816	0.088	0.284	0	1
<i>Age</i>	34,825	37.333	13.668	18	90
<i>Gender</i>	34,918	0.489	0.5	0	1
<i>Education</i>	34,802	3.701	1.714	0	7
<i>Marital Status</i>	34,604	0.643	0.479	0	1
<i>Income</i>	32,054	2.304	0.998	1	4
<i>Crisis</i>	21,554	0.135	0.342	0	1
<i>Breakdown</i>	21,554	0.337	0.473	0	1
<i>Theft/Material Loss</i>	4,802	0.133	0.34	0	1
<i>Work/Residence Destruction</i>	4,802	0.081	0.272	0	1
<i>Public Property Destruction</i>	4,786	0.144	0.351	0	1
<i>Job Loss</i>	4,795	0.077	0.267	0	1

Table 2A Small Business Owners and Democratic Attitudes *Before* the Start of the Arab Spring

	Democracy is Suitable	Democracy Weak Economy	Democracy Indecisive	Democracy Instability	Democracy Best Option	Democracy = Good	Autocracy = Good
<i>Small Business Owner</i>	-0.557 *** (0.152)	0.061 (0.098)	0.27 *** (0.097)	0.308 *** (0.097)	-0.113 (0.1)	0.032 (0.102)	0.147 (0.099)
<i>Age</i>	0.002 (0.003)	-0.004 * (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	0.005 ** (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	-0.004 * (0.002)
<i>Gender</i>	0.04 (0.071)	0.152 *** (0.049)	0.087 * (0.049)	0.196 *** (0.049)	0.071 (0.05)	-0.095 * (0.05)	0.267 *** (0.049)
<i>Education</i>	-0.032 (0.025)	-0.073 *** (0.018)	-0.067 *** (0.017)	-0.1 *** (0.018)	0.015 (0.018)	0.073 *** (0.018)	-0.116 *** (0.017)
<i>Marital Status</i>	-0.154 * (0.081)	-0.003 (0.058)	0.016 (0.058)	0.036 (0.059)	-0.085 (0.06)	-0.055 (0.059)	0.059 (0.06)
<i>Income</i>	0.092 *** (0.032)	-0.044 ** (0.022)	0.016 (0.022)	-0.034 (0.022)	0.112 *** (0.023)	0.093 *** (0.022)	-0.045 ** (0.022)
constant	5.695 *** (0.189)	—	—	—	—	—	—
Observations	6,392	6,332	6,315	6,277	6,438	6,528	6,461
F-statistic	66.2	—	—	—	—	—	—
Chi-squared statistic	—	439.9	374.2	417.5	344.2	362.2	508
R ²	0.09	—	—	—	—	—	—
Pseudo R ²	—	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.04

Note: *. sig. at 0.1, **. sig. at 0.05, ***. sig. at 0.01. The regression model for “Democracy is Suitable” is a linear OLS model with country fixed effects and robust standard errors. All others employ an ordered logistic model with country fixed effects and robust standard errors. Country fixed effects results not displayed.

Table 3A Small Business Owners and Democratic Attitudes *After* the Start of the Arab Spring

	Democracy = is Suitable	Democracy = Weak Economy	Democracy = Indecisive	Democracy = Instability	Democracy = Best Option	Democracy = Good	Autocracy = Good
<i>Small Business Owner</i>	0.194 ** (0.093)	-0.16 ** (0.065)	-0.101 (0.067)	-0.042 (0.066)	0.309 *** (0.063)	0.068 (0.063)	-0.177 *** (0.068)
<i>Age</i>	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.008 *** (0.002)	-0.005 *** (0.002)	-0.007 *** (0.002)	0.004 ** (0.002)	0.01 *** (0.002)	-0.012 *** (0.002)
<i>Gender</i>	0.08 (0.055)	0.007 (0.038)	0.016 (0.038)	0.004 (0.038)	-0.057 (0.039)	-0.047 (0.039)	-0.086 ** (0.041)
<i>Education</i>	0.016 (0.018)	-0.064 *** (0.012)	-0.041 *** (0.012)	-0.085 *** (0.012)	0.03 ** (0.013)	0.071 *** (0.013)	-0.096 *** (0.013)
<i>Marital Status</i>	0.123 ** (0.063)	-0.036 (0.043)	-0.034 (0.043)	-0.045 (0.043)	0.007 (0.044)	0.057 (0.045)	0.006 (0.048)
<i>Income</i>	0.144 *** (0.031)	-0.053 ** (0.022)	-0.067 *** (0.021)	-0.035 (0.021)	-0.046 ** (0.022)	-0.017 (0.022)	0.091 *** (0.023)
constant	5.147 *** (0.163)	—	—	—	—	—	—
Observations	10,419	10,103	10,159	10,145	10,177	10,631	10,458
F-statistic	27.4	—	—	—	—	—	—
Chi-squared statistic	—	387	331.3	455.8	562.7	586.9	651
R ²	0.03	—	—	—	—	—	—
Pseudo R ²	—	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.03

Note: *. sig. at 0.1, **. sig. at 0.05, *** - sig. at 0.01. The regression model for “Democracy is Suitable” is a linear OLS model with country fixed effects and robust standard errors. All others employ an ordered logistic model with country fixed effects and robust standard errors. Country fixed effects results not displayed.

Table 4A Democratic Attitudes among Small Business Owners in Crisis/Breakdown Countries, Odds Ratios

	Democracy = Weak Economy	Democracy = Indecisive	Democracy = Instability	Democracy = Best Option	Democracy = Good	Autocracy = Good
<i>Age</i>	0.985 *** (0.004)	0.994 (0.004)	0.991 ** (0.004)	1.015 *** (0.004)	1.022 *** (0.004)	0.98 *** (0.004)
<i>Gender</i>	0.93 (0.101)	1.052 (0.113)	0.993 (0.11)	1.219 * (0.132)	1.059 (0.121)	0.684 *** (0.087)
<i>Education</i>	0.972 (0.025)	0.986 (0.026)	0.913 *** (0.025)	1.029 (0.028)	1.108 *** (0.035)	0.94 * (0.03)
<i>Marital Status</i>	1.183 * (0.119)	1.108 (0.11)	1.147 (0.113)	0.718 *** (0.07)	0.903 (0.094)	1.276 ** (0.15)
<i>Income</i>	1.037 (0.049)	1.001 (0.048)	1.092 * (0.053)	0.799 *** (0.039)	0.916 * (0.047)	1.27 *** (0.067)
<i>Crisis</i>	1.893 *** (0.193)	1.376 *** (0.136)	1.757 *** (0.171)	0.498 *** (0.052)	0.413 *** (0.049)	1.643 *** (0.199)
<i>Breakdown</i>	1.249 ** (0.121)	1.086 (0.101)	1.195 * (0.115)	0.655 *** (0.066)	0.798 ** (0.085)	1.291 ** (0.143)
Observations	2,018	2,031	2,024	2,048	2,099	2,074
Chi-squared statistic	64.4	13.3	54.4	100.6	106.4	74.1
Pseudo R ²	0.01	0.002	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.02

Note: *. sig. at 0.1, **. sig. at 0.05, *** - sig. at 0.01. The regression model is an ordered logistic model with robust standard errors. Countries are coded "Crisis", if surveys were conducted during or after a governmental crisis as the result of Arab Spring-related protests but with no regime breakdown (Algeria [wave 2 only], Jordan [wave 3 only], Morocco [wave 3], Yemen [wave 2 only]). Countries are coded "Breakdown", if surveys were conducted after a regime breakdown as the result of Arab Spring-related protests (Egypt [waves 2 and 3], Libya [wave 3], Tunisia [waves 2 and 3], and Yemen [wave 3 only]). Non-crisis/breakdown countries during the Arab Spring are Algeria [wave 3 only], Kuwait [waves 2 and 3], Lebanon [waves 2 and 3], Saudi Arabia [wave 2], and Sudan [waves 2 and 3].

Table 5A Factors Associated with Experiencing Loss/Destruction during the Arab Spring, Coefficients and SEs

	Theft or Material Loss	Work/Residence Destruction	Public Property Destruction	Job Loss
<i>Small Business Owner</i>	0.501 *** (0.15)	0.575 *** (0.195)	-0.123 (0.18)	0.568 *** (0.19)
<i>Age</i>	0.001 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.005)	-0.007 * (0.004)	-0.014 ** (0.005)
<i>Gender</i>	-0.25 *** (0.091)	-0.191 * (0.115)	-0.265 *** (0.09)	-0.204 * (0.119)
<i>Education</i>	0.074 ** (0.029)	0.054 (0.036)	0.135 *** (0.028)	0.114 *** (0.036)
<i>Marital Status</i>	-0.001 (0.101)	0.192 (0.129)	0.069 (0.1)	0.162 (0.131)
<i>Income</i>	0.065 (0.051)	0.027 (0.062)	0.263 *** (0.052)	0.154 ** (0.066)
constant	-2.184 *** (0.264)	-2.33 *** (0.313)	-2.433 *** (0.261)	-2.271 *** (0.326)
Observations	4,683	4,683	4,668	4,677
Chi-squared statistic	51.8	81	184.8	103.7
Pseudo R ²	0.01	0.03	0.05	0.04

Note: *- sig. at 0.1, ** - sig. at 0.05, *** - sig. at 0.01. The dependent variable is a respondent's answer ("yes" coded "1" and "no" coded "0") to experiencing a particular event as a result of the Arab Spring demonstrations. Countries included are only those where the question was asked: Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and Yemen. The regression model is a logistic model with robust standard errors and country fixed effects. Country fixed effects results not displayed. Data are from wave 3 of the Arab Barometer.

Table 6A Mean Responses for Democracy Questions in Crisis and Breakdown Countries

	Small Business Owner	Employer/Director of Firm with 10 Employees or More	Professional (lawyer, accountant, teacher, doctor, etc.)	Difference in Means between Small Business Owners and Other Occupational Groups
Democracy is Suitable (0 to 10)	5.726 (844)	5.783 (129)	6.129 (317)	-0.303 **
Democracy = Weak Economy (1 to 4)	2.16 (808)	2.053 (131)	1.984 (319)	0.155 ***
Democracy = Indecisive (1 to 4)	2.241 (816)	2.168 (131)	2.097 (318)	0.123 ***
Democracy = Instability (1 to 4)	2.223 (807)	2.183 (131)	1.994 (318)	0.174 ***
Democracy = Best Option (1 to 4)	3.104 (827)	3.146 (130)	3.226 (323)	-0.099 **
Democracy = Good (1 to 4)	3.449 (859)	3.466 (131)	3.522 (318)	-0.056 *
Autocracy = Good (1 to 4)	1.522 (848)	1.385 (130)	1.432 (317)	0.104 ***

Note: Independent sample *t*-tests used (*- sig. at 0.1, **- sig. at 0.05, *** - sig. at 0.01). The number of observations indicated in parentheses. Variables are coded so that higher values indicate the respondent agrees more with the statement.